

# Beyond the Machine: Clientelist Brokers and Interest Organizations in Latin America

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## Abstract

Organizational membership is one of the strongest, yet overlooked, predictors of vote buying across Latin America. We argue that this relationship is driven by the fact that politicians outsource some of their vote-buying efforts to interest associations. In contrast to the existing literature that focuses on party brokers, who are loyal to a single political machine, we introduce the concepts of *organizational brokers*, who represent interest associations and renegotiate ties to political parties between election cycles, and *hybrid brokers*, who split their loyalties between an interest association and a single political party. We illustrate the operation of these alternative broker types through case studies of street-vending organizations in an uninstitutionalized party system, Colombia, and peasant organizations in an institutionalized party system, Mexico. Attention to the role of brokers and the organizations that they represent has implications for political accountability, collective action, and the persistence of clientelism.

## Keywords

clientelism, patronage, brokers, interest organizations, Latin American politics

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Clientelism is often conceptualized as a contingent exchange between *individual* voters and elected politicians or their agents. This view overlooks the role of collective social actors. Interest organizations, in contrast, are associated with lobbying and protest, but not electoral exchange. Yet in many low- and middle-income democracies, organizational membership, not poverty or partisan activity, is the strongest predictor of exposure to vote buying. This relationship holds across a variety of institutional contexts, from countries famous for machine politics, like Argentina, to those notable for their lack of coherent parties, like Peru. If clientelism is about the exchange of goods between individual voters and parties, what role do interest associations play?

Our central argument is that leaders of interest associations often mediate clientelistic exchanges. They serve as political brokers—ground-level intermediaries between parties and voters—who can identify the needs of clients, distribute goods, and monitor behavior. Brokers have attracted increasing attention in the literature on clientelism (Gingerich, 2013; Gingerich & Medina, 2013; Koter, 2013; Krishna, 2007; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013; Szwarcberg, 2012a, 2012b; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012; Zarazaga, 2014a, 2014b). Nonetheless, most recent work defines brokers as agents of a political party. Stokes et al. (2013), for instance, argue that “only locally embedded *agents of the machine* command the knowledge of voter preferences and *partisan inclinations* needed” to act as brokers (p. 100, emphasis added). We disagree: *Party brokers* are but one subtype of intermediaries. We propose a broader typology of brokers based both on brokers’ connections to a political party and to their base, which can include collective actors. We introduce the concepts of *organizational brokers*, who represent the collective interests of voters in interest associations and renegotiate ties to political parties between election cycles, and *hybrid brokers*, who split their loyalties between an interest association and a single political party. Our typology also integrates independent brokers, which the classic literature on clientelism identifies as local elites who use their coercive power to mobilize voters for their party of choice. An exclusive focus on party brokers thus misses important theoretical and empirical variation in how clientelistic exchange works and its consequences for political accountability.

For a sense of this variation, consider two sketches of political brokers. In Buenos Aires, Argentina, brokers affiliated with the Peronist Party receive goods—cash, mattresses, food, and so on—which they distribute to their clients prior to elections. Brokers are rewarded with positions in the political party or government employment based on the number of voters who show up to rallies and polls. Individual clients know that brokers work for a given political party, and that their access to social programs and goods may depend

on their individual demonstrated loyalty to the party. This is the familiar *party broker*. In contrast, consider brokerage relationships in Bogotá, Colombia. Prior to an election, leaders of interest organizations often receive phone calls from politicians from different parties asking if they will mobilize their members. Leaders negotiate a price that they will be paid to persuade their members to support the party at the polls or at campaign rallies. They usually, but not always, pass along a portion of this payment as individual or collective goods to mobilize their members for the election. Organization members may not know about the payment to their leaders; they expect the party endorsed by their leaders to provide local public goods or specialized policies after the election if their group shows its collective loyalty. The examples display stark differences—The voter receives a personal payment in the former and not necessarily in the latter, the voter expects only particularistic benefits from the broker in the former and additional collective ones in the latter, and voters are monitored individually in the former and as groups in the latter.

A narrow conception of brokers as party activists employed by political parties truncates descriptive findings and can lead to erroneous conclusions about the determinants of clientelism. At the micro level, studies of “who gets bought” have ignored associational membership as an explanatory variable. If politicians delegate clientelistic exchange to organization leaders, then these leaders and their members are more vulnerable to vote buying than other citizens. At the macrohistorical level, the path from clientelism to programmatic politics likely depends on the type of brokerage relationship that characterizes a political system. The typical assumption is that clientelism depends on the existence of a party machine, and dies along with that party. Our findings suggest that clientelism can survive changes in the party system through adaptation in the form of brokerage. How the prevalence of clientelism and form of brokerage vary with the structure of parties and interest associations constitutes a rich area for future research.

In bringing interest organizations into discussions of clientelism, we take a broad definition of clientelism as *any distribution of particularistic or club goods conditioned on the political behavior of an individual or group*. As long as voters understand that their political support is required to receive a good—excludable or nonexcludable—and some authority figure holds voters accountable to the exchange relationship, we label it “clientelism.”<sup>1</sup> We also allow for monitoring of political behavior to occur at the group level, rather than conceptualize contingency as requiring goods to be linked to an individual’s voting behavior. This move is empirically and conceptually justified. Much monitoring occurs by holding brokers accountable for turnout at polls and rallies or vote shares at polling stations. Individuals who receive goods

based on group outcomes still have incentives to shift their behavior for collective awards (Smith & Bueno De Mesquita, 2012).

The article proceeds in four parts. First, we show that organizational membership is one of the most important and robust predictors of exposure to clientelism across Latin America. Second, we propose a theory of clientelism that connects the literature on interest associations to work on clientelism by focusing on the potential attachments of brokers to organizations and develop a typology of brokers in terms of their relationship to parties and to organizations. Next, we illustrate the dynamics of organization-mediated clientelism through case studies of brokerage based on original field research involving street-vending organizations in an uninstitutionalized party system, Colombia, and peasant organizations in an institutionalized party system, Mexico. The final section concludes.

## The Puzzle: Interest Organizations and Clientelism

Most models of clientelism assume that politicians reward individual voters with particularistic benefits. Therefore, research on vote buying, a highly studied variant of clientelism, has focused on the types of individual characteristics that affect the probability of selling one's votes. In particular, the poor are thought to be more susceptible to vote buying because they derive a higher marginal utility from the cash and durables transferred prior to elections than middle-class voters.<sup>2</sup> Organizations get short shrift in explanations of whose vote gets bought. This section uses survey data to show that organizational membership is a more important and consistent predictor of vote buying than income across Latin America. The results expose the puzzle of what role organizations play in vote buying, but do not offer a direct test of the assertion that organization-embedded brokers drive the relationship.

To illustrate the importance of organizational membership, we use individual-level data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project's (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer.<sup>3</sup> The 2010 and 2012 waves included a question about exposure to vote buying or, more specifically, whether a candidate or party offered the respondent "a favor, food, or any other benefit" in return for her vote.<sup>4</sup> Respondents indicate if they "never," "sometimes," or "often" have been offered material benefits in exchange for their vote. For ease of analysis, we recode this question as a binary variable (*Client*) that takes on a value of "1" if respondents report that they have "sometimes" or "often" been offered a good in exchange for their vote. While vote buying is a subtype of political clientelism (Nichter, 2014) and some organization members may not report payments received from their leaders as vote buying or observe direct payments to their leaders, data limitations prevent a broader analysis of other


forms of clientelism, such as turnout buying or the contingent exchange of local public goods. However, we expect that the relationship for these other variants would be at least as strong, given that they are even more likely to operate through organizations.

Our key variable of interest is participation in civic associations. We create a single additive index of civic participation (*Civic*) based on responses to six questions that ask how often the respondent does the following: assists in community problem solving, attends religious meetings, attends school board meetings, attends community improvement committee meetings, attends professional association meetings, and attends meetings of mothers. To construct the index, we give each individual a score of “1” if they participated in the activity at least “1 or 2 times a year” and a “0” otherwise. This index captures the breadth of participation in civic associations, thus reflecting the degree to which the respondent is engaged in different types of collective pursuits, as opposed to frequency of participation in a single type of organization. The appendix provides summary statistics, and confirms that the results are robust to alternative index constructions.

We compare the predictive power of our civic participation index with income, the explanatory variable most commonly hypothesized to affect the probability of exposure to vote buying. We measure income in two ways, as self-reported household income (*Income*) and as an index of consumer durables (*Wealth*) to account for nonresponse and measurement error on income questions. In the displays of our results below, we divide respondents into deciles by country based on their civic, income, and wealth scores.

To compare the predictive power of income and organizational membership, we run logit models with country- and year-fixed effects. We include a number of common socioeconomic controls—age, sex, urban, and years of education—and report the predicted probability of being a target of vote buying when a typical individual moves from the lowest to highest decile of organizational participation, income, or wealth. To aid in the interpretation of the results, we graph the predicted probabilities here and report statistical tables in the appendix.

Figure 1 shows that organizational membership is an important predictor of reported offers of vote buying: A typical woman who participates in no organizations has a predicted probability of being a target for vote buying of 8%, while a woman at the highest level of participation has a predicted probability of 32%.<sup>5</sup> In contrast, the two measures of income are marginally associated with exposure to vote buying. Even using the more predictive wealth measure, a typical woman in the bottom decile of wealth has a 16% chance of reporting vote buying compared with a 13% probability for a woman in the top decile.



**Figure 1.** Predicted probabilities of exposure to vote buying and 95% confidence intervals for an average urban woman.


No survey questions allow us to observe whether the prevalence of organization-embedded brokers drives this relationship, but we can rule out the most prominent alternative explanations and omitted variables. In particular, an alternative explanation implicit in Stokes et al. (2013) is that core supporters join quasipartisan civic organizations as a way to signal party loyalty and gain access to benefits. For instance, participation in citizen power councils in Nicaragua (Gonzalez-Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge, Meléndez, Osorio, & Nickerson, 2012) or social missions in Venezuela (Penfold-Becerra, 2007), which are closely associated with support for the Sandinista and Chavista projects, offers a way for party leaders or their agents to identify and reward core supporters. This explanation, however, depends on the existence of stable parties, who are able to co-opt or create civic organizations and monitor participation. Under this explanation, the partisan rewards to joining organizations would disappear in the absence of a political machine that is able to carry out these tasks. We therefore examine whether the role of civic participation is limited to countries with stable political parties or strong personalist projects.

The left panel of Figure 2 shows that civic participation uniformly predicts more exposure to vote buying across Latin America and even in countries with volatile political parties (the appendix shows these results hold in the full sample). Peru and Colombia, for instance, are cases of at least partial party-system “collapse” (Morgan, 2011). Yet, organizational membership still is associated with reports of vote buying. The consistency of civic participation as a predictor of vote buying is even more surprising given the inconsistent role of income and wealth. As the right panel demonstrates, while income is associated with vote buying in some countries like Argentina, there is almost no relationship in others like Mexico and Colombia. Given the inexistence of stable parties to organize and monitor civic organizations in many Latin American countries, it is implausible that organizational membership is simply another way for political machines to target their core supporters.

In addition, these results are robust to potential omitted variables, such as partisanship and reciprocity. Organization members may be generally more participatory “types” who also take part in campaign activities and partisan groups and thus are more likely to receive vote-buying offers. We account for this possibility by controlling for partisan participation through an additive index of whether individuals attend party meetings and work on political campaigns (*Partisan*). We also control for stated interest in politics (*Interest*) in case organization members engage more in politics and turn up at the polls more in general, as Faughnan and Zechmeister (2011) suggest.

Beyond partisanship, people who join organizations may differ in their willingness to contribute to the community from those who remain on the sidelines. Finan and Schechter (2012) find that Paraguayan brokers target “reciprocal” individuals who return favors in a variety of nonelectoral contexts. It is possible that politicians rely on participation in organizations as a heuristic for whether individuals will “live up” to their end of the bargain, leading to a spurious correlation between civic participation and clientelism. However, the theoretical logic could easily point in the opposite direction: Individuals who engage in organizations may have stronger civic commitments that make them less responsive to material inducements. Lawson and Greene (2014) find that priming civic attitudes made Mexican survey respondents substantially *less* supportive of vote buying. We therefore control for reciprocity through the closest proxies available: whether individuals believe that members of their community are trustworthy (*Trust*) and whether individuals self-describe as reliable (*Reliability*).

Encouragingly, civic participation remains a significant predictor of exposure to vote buying with the controls for partisanship and reciprocity. A typical organization member who does not participate in partisan activities still is



**Figure 2.** The predicted probability of vote buying by civic participation (above) and income (below) in select Latin American countries.



4 times more likely to be approached to sell her vote compared with one who does not participate in civic organizations. That said, individuals who participate in *both* civic and partisan activities have a very high probability of offers of vote buying. A typical female who participates in the maximum number of partisan and civic organizations has a 46% probability of receiving an offer to sell her vote, compared with just 24% if she only participates in civic organizations and 19% if she exclusively participates in partisan activities. Both measures of reciprocity are associated with a significantly *lower* chance of vote buying, and controls for political interest do not change the results. Thus, it seems unlikely that the relationship between civic organizations and vote buying can be accounted for by lurking variables.

Measurement error might present a threat to inference if social-desirability bias leads participants in organizations to censor their responses less than nonparticipants. Data limitations prevent the use of a list experiment to improve reporting, as recommended by Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012). However, our dependent variable question does not ask if the voter accepted the benefit, which reduces the appearance of wrongdoing. In addition, organization members may be especially vulnerable to social norms against vote buying, given that they are more embedded in their communities. The direction of the bias thus makes it less likely that we would observe a positive association between civic participation and exposure to vote buying in the absence of measurement strategies to reduce response bias. Indeed, Gonzalez-Ocantos et al.'s analysis is one of the few survey studies to observe a positive relationship between civic participation and vote buying.

To be clear, this statistical analysis does not show a causal effect of civic participation on exposure to vote buying. However, our theory does not depend on unidirectional causation. Rather, we propose a complementary relationship in which civic organizations enable clientelist exchange through their leaders and conversely, clientelist benefits spur organizational participation. Civic participation makes it more attractive for parties to distribute clientelistic benefits to organizations and negotiate with their leaders to secure a bloc of support. At the same time, clientelist exchange can aid recruitment for civic organizations. Organization leaders often negotiate deals with politicians because they hope that the promise of clientelistic benefits induces participation, and some individuals join to gain access to these benefits. Notably, this hypothesized complementarity diverges from scholarship that argues that patronage politics atomizes civil society and demobilizes members (Fox, 1994; Kurtz, 2004; Levitsky, 2003).

In sum, this analysis adds to the existing literature by showing that there is a strong and consistent association between reported vote buying and organizational membership. However, the statistical analysis does not establish why

participants in organizations are more frequent targets of vote buying. What we do rule out is that the correlation is epiphenomenal to other factors that independently are associated with both civic participation and exposure to vote buying, such as partisanship and reciprocity. Our theory, which we develop next and support with qualitative evidence, is that the brokerage function of organization leaders helps explain this robust relationship.

## The Theory: Brokers and Interest Organizations

Our theory focuses on the social network that organizational membership implies and, more specifically, on the role that organization leaders play in linking their members to clientelistic rewards. Organization leaders often enter into exchanges with political parties in which they promise their groups' votes or mobilization in exchange for benefits. The group leader thus acts as a broker, distributing benefits to his members to encourage them to support a given party. This model relaxes the conventional assumption that brokers relate to voters through *individualized* quid pro quo exchange relationships, and shifts the focus away from brokers who serve as the agents of a political party. We stress that brokers often represent organizations and balance the collective interests of their members against immediate material rewards. Not just parties seek to control their brokers' behavior; there is a second principal-agent relationship in which organization members try to hold their leaders accountable.

To account for the unique accountability issues inherent to organization-embedded brokers, we propose a theoretical framework that specifies two separate dynamics of electoral brokerage: the *party-broker* exchange and the *broker-base* exchange. This theoretical framework unites often-disparate literatures on interest representation and clientelism, and also provides a common vocabulary to speak about clientelistic brokerage across a range of political contexts.

### A Typology of Brokers

We conceive of brokers as balancing three possible sets of interests. Brokers often seek to maximize votes for a single political party, or what we label a *partisan interest* (P). The broker may be a party activist who supports the party for programmatic reasons. Or, he may care about a party's electoral outcomes because they affect his potential job prospects or his ability to extract partisan benefits after the election. When a broker cares about a party's electoral fate for ideological or instrumental reasons, then it may make sense to think of brokers as agents of political parties.

Recent correctives to the party-broker model have highlighted that brokers, even when in long-term relationships with parties, can use party resources to further personal motives (Stokes et al., 2013; Szwarcberg, 2012a, 2012b). When a broker is motivated by personal benefits that are not contingent on party success, we call this a *rent-seeking interest* (*R*). From this perspective, brokers present a principal-agent problem to parties because their behavior cannot be exhaustively monitored. Parties depend on imperfect instruments like attendance at rallies or electoral returns to gauge whether brokers use patronage goods for their intended purposes.

The recognition of brokers' rent-seeking interests still overlooks the fact that brokers can be motivated by what we call a *social interest* (*S*) that diverges from partisan or personal goals. When a broker is embedded in an interest organization, he has a stake in promoting the organization's collective interests, either for altruistic reasons or because pursuing these interests bolsters his status within the organization or the broader community.<sup>6</sup> These collective interests may include programmatic policies, club goods, or particularistic benefits that accrue to the organization's members. The key factor that distinguishes the social interest is that it drives the broker to bargain with the party patron *on behalf of an interest organization*. In this sense, brokers embedded in interest organizations operate much like special interest groups attempting to extract goods and policies. The main difference is that special interest politics is a form of participation in which groups *donate* money to legislators in exchange for preferential policies (for instance, see Grossman & Helpman, 2002). In contrast, organization-embedded brokers tend to represent lower-class or fragmented groups that *receive* cash or other particularistic benefits from parties to mobilize their members for electoral purposes. Because parties can offer these opaque benefits directly to the leader, rather than exchanging collective policies for support, interest organization members face unique risks that their leaders prioritize their personal rents over the social interest.

When brokers represent organizations, a principal-agent relationship arises between voters and brokers, distinct from the party's and a special interest group's monitoring challenge. Voters trust brokers to provide accurate information on which candidate best represents their interests and not to accept personal payments or partisan rewards in lieu of goods negotiated on behalf of the organization. Even when voters receive a fraction of clientelistic payments, they do not always observe the payments that parties provide to brokers and therefore cannot depend on brokers to represent their interests faithfully. Analogously to the first principal-agent problem between parties and brokers, this problem is alleviated when base members can monitor the broker's activities through internal elections or the broker has a personal stake in the organization's fate that leads him to prioritize collective goals.

Given differences in base and party linkages, we distinguish types of brokers based on two dimensions. The first, which has received more attention in the literature, distinguishes whether a broker has a relationship with a single party or with multiple parties. If a broker has a durable relationship with a single party, he exclusively mobilizes his clients for candidates of that party. If a broker lacks such a relationship, he can shop between parties in each election.

Our central contribution is to introduce a second dimension, regarding whether a broker is embedded in an organization. The organization may vary in the degree of formality, its mobilization strategies, policy agenda, and so on. The distinction we make between an organization and a social network is that an organization is “programmatically” in the sense that its “characteristic and primary function is to advance the common interests of groups of individuals” (Olson, 1965, p. 7). Brokers may maintain strong social networks, but if no agreed-upon collective interests unite the members of these networks or most members of the network only are connected to each other through the broker, the broker is not embedded in an organization. If a broker leads or negotiates on behalf of an organization with social interests, then he is embedded in an organization.

Figure 3 distinguishes four types of brokers based on their relationships to parties and to interest organizations. Based on these linkages, the subscripts indicate the types of interests that motivate brokers (again, *R* indicates a rent-seeking interest, *P* is a partisan interest, and *S* is a social interest). We now briefly walk through each type of broker and their respective accountability issues before turning to the detailed case studies of the types of brokers that are embedded in interest organizations. In these depictions, we discuss two types of factors—party systems and historical patterns of interest representation—that are likely to condition the dominant mode of brokerage. Brokers retain agency to choose the type of linkages that they negotiate, but their choice set can be constrained by the party system and organizational structure where they operate.

*Independent Broker.* The upper half of Figure 3 corresponds to brokers who are not embedded in interest organizations. The upper-left corner combines a lack of organizational ties with weak party commitments, producing the *independent broker*. While an independent broker lacks lasting ties to a party or organization, he often maintains a personal network or coercive power that allows him to mobilize voters. As an ideal type, independent brokers act according to their rent-seeking interests. They can be thought of as “subcontracted employees,” who try to negotiate the best payment possible from the politicians who “employ” them. Given their loose ties to

	<b>Mobilizes Voters for Multiple Parties</b>	<b>Mobilizes Voters for a Single Party</b>
<b>Not embedded in organization</b>	<i>Independent Broker</i> R	<i>Party Broker</i> R, P
<b>Embedded in organization</b>	<i>Organizational Broker</i> R, S	<i>Hybrid Broker</i> R, P, S

**Figure 3.** A linkage-based broker typology.

parties, independent brokers primarily distribute short-term material inducements to sway or mobilize voters prior to elections.

Independent brokers present a significant principal-agent problem to parties. Party leaders may base broker payments on outcome-contingent measures of success like turnout at a giving polling station. However, because this broker has no personal stake in the short- or long-term success of the party, he may appropriate preelection goods or distribute benefits indiscriminately, if the probability of detection is low. Politicians look for brokers who command loyalty or power within the community in the hopes that voters are more likely to respond to their gifts; the price paid to the broker may increase with the “quality” of their base.

Independent brokers likely proliferate in countries or subnational units with high levels of party volatility or little history of incorporation of interest organizations into political parties. In democracies where parties change each electoral cycle, brokers must renegotiate with parties prior to each election. Peru provides clear examples. Candidates hire networks of competing “free agents” with little allegiance to the parties that hire them or to the communities in which they operate. In a survey concerning the 2010 and 2011 elections, almost half of respondents who reported being offered clientelist benefits had never even seen the person who offered them the good before the election (Muñoz, 2014).

In contrast to the loose—if nonexistent—ties of some independent brokers to their clients, a different variant of independent brokerage has been documented in studies of “patrimonial” clientelism in rural areas of the developing

world (such as the classic studies of Albuquerque & Werner, 1985; Lemarchand, 1972; Scott, 1969). In these studies, parties are largely absent or fluid in their connections to brokers. While rural notables sometimes do have a stake in the electoral success of a given party, approaching the party broker discussed next, they generate power from their own economic position. Thus, they are free to negotiate with different parties, as with other forms of independent brokers.

Accounts of patrimonial brokers tend to emphasize hierarchical and repeated interactions with clients that extend beyond the electoral context, such as between landlords and peasants. Patrimonial brokers traditionally gained power through the monitoring of individual behavior matched with a threat of retaliation. Although the secret ballot weakens their control (Baland & Robinson, 2008), patrimonial brokers can adapt to democratic contexts by making goods contingent on collective behaviors or cues of reciprocity (Finan & Schechter, 2012; Gingerich, 2013). Territorially rooted elites may care about the well-being of their clients for altruistic or instrumental reasons. But, unlike organizational brokers (discussed below), the patrimonial broker is not accountable to a defined collective interest.

*Party Broker.* The upper-right corner of Figure 3 combines an exclusive party commitment with a lack of associational ties, producing the *party broker*. This broker is not beholden to a defined social interest because he is not connected to a group that pursues collective goals. That said, party brokers typically draw on networks of clients who they know and who depend on them during and after election cycles. Effective party brokers are aware of voters' partisan preferences, likelihood of voting, degree of economic vulnerability, and the types of goods that they prefer (Auyero, 2001; Stokes et al., 2013; Zarazaga, 2014a).

We share Stokes et al.'s (2013) view of party brokers as actors who balance their rent-seeking interests and partisan interests. As with the independent broker, a party broker is interested in maximizing his short-term income. Unlike the independent broker, the party broker also is interested in his future job prospects—either as a broker, a future candidate, or a government employee—which improve if the party wins the election. As a type of party activist, the broker also may have an ideological interest or brand identification that can motivate him to work for one party over another and minimize his extraction of party resources.

Compared with the independent broker, the party broker presents a less severe principal-agent problem for the party because the broker's interests often align with those of the party. Because the broker is embedded in the party, party leaders can award promotions or government employment in

exchange for satisfactory electoral returns. This linkage encourages the broker to weigh party performance more heavily than does the independent broker. Nonetheless, parties have imperfect information regarding whether brokers give out the full value of party goods or distribute them to voters who would not have supported the party otherwise. At low levels of political competition, brokers also have few incentives to minimize rent extraction (Stokes et al., 2013; Szwarcberg, 2012a).

Party brokers have no direct accountability to voters. Competition among party brokers improves accountability because clients can accept a better offer from a rival when brokers do not deliver (Auyero, 2001; Zarazaga, 2014a). While creating exit options, competition does not lead the broker to incorporate a social interest. In the absence of an organization, clients may not agree on a collective good to exchange for their votes or deter individuals from accepting private goods from a rival party or faction. The party broker thus will be less able and willing to provide local public goods. Of course, some brokers who work for party machines are embedded in tight-knit communities that advance collective goals, giving rise to the hybrid broker discussed below.

Stable party systems, particularly those featuring machine parties, are conducive to party brokerage. Machine parties capitalize on extensive social networks—typically in lower-class urban areas—and control over state resources to retain “in-house” brokerage operations. Party brokers have operated in New York and Chicago (Scott, 1969) and southern Italy (Chubb, 1982), but recent literature has focused on party brokers of the dominant Peronist Party in the greater Buenos Aires area of Argentina. Brokers are sometimes depicted as local elected politicians, in which case partisan allegiances are explicit (Szwarcberg, 2012b; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). Brokers also can be unelected middlemen who receive state resources from officeholders and distribute them to voters that they know intimately (Auyero, 2001; Brusco, Nazareno, & Stokes, 2004; Levitsky, 2003; Zarazaga, 2014a, 2014b). In both cases, Peronist Party brokers (*punteros*) compete among themselves for party-specific “big ticket” rewards: candidate nominations, public-sector jobs, college scholarships, and so on. *Punteros*’ short-term benefits are conditional on party success because their compensation often depends on electoral results and turnout at campaign events. Their long-term benefits also align with those of the party, because a broker’s career prospects improve as the party wins elections and secures access to more goods (Szwarcberg, 2012a).

**Organizational Broker.** The lower-left corner of Figure 3 combines weak party ties with embeddedness in an organization, which corresponds to an

*organizational broker*. Organizational brokers have the ability to negotiate with politicians who represent different political parties, “shopping” for the best offer from election to election. Unlike independent or party brokers, however, organizational brokers also represent social interests in the form of their organizations’ collective interests, which can lead them to support politicians who deliver the types of benefits that the group’s members prefer.

Organizational brokers often occupy leadership positions and command a loyal following. They are effective brokers because they can mobilize their members for electoral campaigns and at the polls. Given their durable relationship with members, organizational brokers can demand club goods and policies that only can be delivered after the election by parties. But, because organizational brokers negotiate contingent, rather than stable ties to parties, they may focus on extracting goods prior to the election that they can use as selective incentives to sway members’ vote choice and encourage ongoing participation. The arrangement thus functions best if the odds that the party can win to secure postelection goods are high or the party distributes an important fraction of goods before the election.

A different type of principal-agent problem arises in the case of organizational brokers. Organizational brokers balance their rent-seeking and social interests, and thus may not pursue the best “deal” for their organization members in negotiations with parties. Brokers may support candidates who offer personal payments to them, rather than endorsing the candidate who best advances collective interests. Even when leaders capture most of the rents from parties, these exchanges differ from prebendalism, where payments are provided exclusively to secure elite loyalty (Van de Walle, 2007). Organization leaders must pass along some portion of party payments, or draw on their reserves of loyalty accumulated through past service, to mobilize their members for elections. Leadership accountability varies widely across organizations. In internally democratic organizations, members hold brokers accountable by reelecting leaders who provide sought-after collective goods, and voting out those who abuse their positions for personal gain. As in the case of party brokers, competition among organizations and their brokers offers clients an exit option that can pressure brokers to prioritize collective interests.

Organizational brokers are likely to emerge in contexts with volatile party systems and dense base-level organizations. Under such circumstances, parties lack their own brokerage networks but are able to capitalize on organizational networks instead. A rich literature on urban squatter settlements shows how leaders use the votes of neighborhood association members as leverage to secure protection against eviction and community improvements (e.g., Alvarez Rivadulla, 2012; Auerbach, 2014; D. Collier, 1976; Gay, 1994, 1999;



Ray, 1969). Gay (1999) documents how some leaders in Brazilian squatter settlements “played politicians at their own game” (p. 51) by bargaining for the best offer of local public goods prior to the election from an array of candidates eager to buy votes. Leaders also received personal payments from candidates, but they won repeated internal elections for their ability to deliver concrete collective goods.

Multiethnic societies that lack institutionalized linkages between ethnic groups and parties also give rise to a variant of organizational brokers in the form of ethnic leaders. Chiefs can be used to channel instrumental benefits to local communities and negotiate with a variety of parties to extract bundles of rewards (Koter, 2013). Organizational brokerage depends on the existence of coherent organizations, and centralized ethnic groups in Africa indeed receive more wholesale offers to sell their votes than decentralized ones (Kramon, 2014). To the extent that ethnic leaders incorporate collective interests, rather than simply accepting the offer that is most lucrative for themselves, they resemble organizational, rather than patrimonial, brokers.

*Hybrid Broker.* Last, the lower-right corner represents the *hybrid broker*, who has loyalties to both a single political party and to an organization. Given this complex arrangement, hybrid brokers combine personal, partisan, and social interests. Like the organizational broker, the hybrid broker bargains for distributive benefits, policy reforms, and collective goods on behalf of organization members. In contrast to the organizational broker, however, he maintains a strong tie to a single political party. This arrangement promises ongoing benefits, but it also reduces the hybrid broker’s bargaining power with the party by inhibiting the threat of exit. Because the hybrid broker’s loyalties are split between the party and the organization, he poses a more acute accountability challenge to base members than the organizational broker.

Hybrid brokers create a double principal–agent problem. Parties and organizations try to control the behavior of their brokers, but are unsure whether the brokers faithfully represent their interests. Beyond concerns about rent seeking, the party patron fears that hybrid brokers serve the organization, while the organization members fear that brokers serve the party and sacrifice their representational capacity.


The broader literature on popular-sector interest representation and corporatism offers tools to understand the “double-edged” nature of single party alignment. Party alignment can grant *access* to political power and desired patronage benefits, but with the potential drawback of limiting the organization’s *autonomy* to determine its goals and strategies (R. B. Collier & Handlin, 2009). Studies of labor corporatism document a similar tension in which union leaders balance the economic interests of their base against the

electoral interests and co-optative pressures of their party allies (Burgess, 2004; R. B. Collier & D. Collier, 1979; Murillo, 2001; Schmitter, 1974). These bifurcated effects are mirrored within organizations. Hybrid brokerage can be unstable because organizations fear that the leader is co-opted by the party and assumes a privileged position (Fox, 1992), divide when factions feel that a party inadequately delivered electoral rewards, and lose legitimacy as they focus on electoral rather than social goals. But, party ties also can increase the provision of selective incentives and collective goods to bolster member recruitment and mobilization (Olson, 1965).

Hybrid brokerage proliferates when stable political parties exist and have routine practices of incorporating interest organizations. Under such circumstances, clientelist networks are subsumed by interest organizations. Leaders of urban popular movements in Mexico City offer examples of hybrid brokers as they retain firm alliances with the left-leaning Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), which dominates politics in the capital, splitting their loyalties between the organization and the party (Hilgers, 2008). Ethnic leaders who maintain consistent ties to a single political party and extract goods to further social interests, such as chiefs in Zambia's stable party system described by Baldwin (2013), offer another example of hybrid brokerage.

Party-system volatility forecloses stable alliances between organizations and a single party. In more stable party systems, however, organization leaders have agency to choose their party linkage strategy. Ideological inclinations lead some organizations to hew to a single party. But even instrumentally oriented leaders sometimes perceive advantages to a stable alliance. While fluid party linkages may increase short-term resource extraction, they also can undermine the provision of goods and policies that require longer time horizons, larger investments, or approval from multiple levels of government. Auerbach (2014), for instance, finds that squatter settlements in India that align with multiple political parties have lower levels of local public goods because rival parties undercut each other's projects and avoid infrastructure investments in neighborhoods with ambiguous loyalties. We also find that organization leaders perceive costs to switching between stable parties, as we detail in the case of Mexico below.

To summarize, this section has introduced a typology of four types of brokers who differ in the number and durability of ties to both parties and interest organizations. Figure 4 visually summarizes the relationships discussed. The broker is represented by a gray dot that connects to political parties (top row) and individual clients (bottom row). Solid lines represent durable connections, whereas dotted lines represent relationships that are renegotiated across electoral cycles. Clientelistic brokers may be embedded directly in a party, as in the case of the party broker, or a base organization, as



**Figure 4.** Broker linkages to parties and voters.

in the case of the organizational broker. They also can occupy an intermediate space, dividing their loyalties between a party and base organization (hybrid broker) or neither (independent broker). This figure also depicts the conditions that are conducive to different modes of brokerage: Party and hybrid brokers rely on stable parties capable of forming durable exchange relationships (solid lines emanating from parties in the top row). Organizational and hybrid brokers are embedded in groups with mutual ties and joint preferences (solid lines connecting voters on the lower row).

In theorizing the role that interest organizations can play in clientelistic exchange, this typology unites largely disconnected literatures on clientelism and interest representation. Many recent studies of clientelism miss the social structures that tie voters together and bring them into contingent exchange relationships with political parties. A key exception is Calvo and Murillo (2013) who map clientelistic *networks*. However, while they document how political connections affect beliefs about the partisan distribution of goods, they do little to interrogate the network structure itself, such as whether more “connected” individuals tend to benefit from clientelistic distributions and who the “nodes” in the network are. Organization members may have a larger number of absolute connections to bring them into contact with partisans and broadcast the word about a given candidate, as suggested by Cruz (2013) and Rueda (2014). Beyond their informational function, however, organizations offer additional logistical advantages. Organizations are social networks with strong ties, clearly defined leaders, collective action and monitoring capacity, and visibility in their communities. These traits make them appealing partners for parties, as the organizations can distribute partisan resources, cement voting blocs, and organize campaign events. This role does not require strong hierarchical ties, but instead forces leaders to balance social interests with competing concerns.

To further flesh out our broker typology, we conclude with original case-study evidence of organizational and hybrid brokers. We pay particular attention to the party-system characteristics that give rise to these types of brokers, beginning with examples of organizational brokers in Colombia’s

fluid party system and then moving to examples of hybrid brokers in Mexico's stable party system. Colombia and Mexico have similar levels of vote buying, but we expect them to have diverse *types* of brokerage relationships due to their contrasting party systems. We select a different type of popular-sector organization for study in each country, urban street vendors in Colombia and rural associations in Mexico, to underscore the range of leaders who can act as brokers. These organizations constitute "most-likely" cases for organizational and hybrid brokers, given that party-system disintegration has been most complete in urban Colombia and parties have been most stable in rural Mexico. Secondary sources complement these cases and suggest that organization-mediated brokerage extends beyond the sectors studied.

## **Organizational Brokers in an Uninstitutionalized Party System**

Colombia's bipartisan system was long considered among the most institutionalized party systems in Latin America. The traditional Conservative and Liberal parties maintained networks of party brokers. While parties fostered intraparty competition, brokers remained loyal to a single party and rooted in specific territorial zones. Between 1986 and 1994, however, Colombia adopted a series of institutional reforms to reduce the power of regional party brokers. It introduced new elected offices and decentralized administrative responsibilities. Traditional parties lost strength, and no coherent party system emerged to replace the bipartisan arrangement. The last five mayors of Bogotá, for instance, have won on their personal "brands," independent from party machines (Pasotti, 2009).

Despite dramatic changes in the party system, clientelism has not disappeared in Colombia. Scholars instead have described a "fractionalization" of clientelism in which traditional parties gave way to "electoral micro-businesses" based around individual personalities and monitoring at the group or polling-station level (Gutiérrez Sanín & Guevara, 2000; Leongómez, 2002) and new types of brokers from armed actors (Eaton, 2006) to teachers unions (Eaton & Chambers-Ju, 2014). Party-system changes have restructured how popular interest groups, such as street-vending associations, participate in politics.

Street-vending associations group together vendors who work in the same geographic area. Street vendors, who mainly work without licenses, have common interests in protection against enforcement and to gain access to permits, legal exemptions, or social programs that increase their job security. From a candidate's perspective, street vendors are an important constituency

because they represent an organized bloc of votes of anywhere from several dozen to several thousand members, and their electoral impact can extend beyond direct votes because they interact with customers to spread information about candidates (e.g. Cross, 1998).

In Colombia, leaders of street-vending associations often serve as organizational brokers who negotiate with multiple political parties. Prior to each election, vending leaders report receiving calls from politicians across the political spectrum with offers of payment for their bloc of votes. In a focus group of 25 vending leaders, for instance, a third reported receiving such offers.<sup>7</sup> Negotiations with a range of parties are possible because parties change frequently between elections, and numerous politicians compete for local offices.

Leaders emphasize that they balance their social and rent-seeking interests when choosing which politician to support. On one hand, leaders care that politicians deliver on their promises and they look for evidence of ideological commitment to street vending. Around half of street-vending leaders emphasized that they seek candidates who will “collaborate” with street vendors and sign written electoral promises to defend vendors’ interests. This fact reflects street vendors’ collective demands: They depend on forbearance, which only can be achieved once a politician is in office (Holland, 2014). Like many other interest associations, street vendors want more than to extract goods from a politician prior to an election and then commit their votes. Therefore, association leaders stress that they risk their credibility as leaders, and their livelihood as street vendors, if a politician reneges on her promise. A typical reasoning comes out in the comments of one vending leader who notes, “I can’t turn over my 1,500 votes for a payment because I need to know the candidates will let us work and have real proposals for vendors.”<sup>8</sup> Association leaders thus have a clear social interest in furthering their members’ objectives.

On the other hand, leaders care about their personal payoffs. Many were quite blunt in describing the payments from politicians as their “salary” for otherwise thankless service as association leaders and their labor in the distribution of preelection goods. Leaders did not necessarily accept the highest bid from politicians; instead, they considered their net payoff based on the politician’s offer and the resources that they would have to expend to deliver votes. When politicians are ideologically distant from most members, it takes more money and personal capital to mobilize voters. Leaders cited their reluctance to mobilize votes for traditional parties and candidates with reputations for opposing vendors. For instance, the leader of one association describes the case of David Luna, a mayoral candidate in 2011 on record for his opposition to street vending:

If you, as a leader, want to support someone from his party, you would lose support for your leadership and you might not even make anything [from the deal]. The vendors can't support one of Luna's candidates! He'd have to pay a fortune for those votes, and you might not get paid if none of your members show up.<sup>9</sup>

Thus, even when leaders seek to maximize their rents, they may end up allying with candidates who suit their members' ideological tastes and collective interests.

Clientelist exchanges between politicians and street-vending associations tend to involve pre- and postelection components. Prior to the election, politicians provide cash or durable goods for leaders to distribute to their members and a personal retainer. Association leaders work to mobilize their voters, and discuss the candidate with their members. Given that Colombia does not have compulsory voting, association leaders play a key role in getting voters to the polls. Almost half of vending leaders reported helping their members to register to vote at a specific location where the results then could be monitored by the leader and subsequently by the party at the polling-station level.

After elections, association leaders generally receive a second payment based on the number of votes that they mobilized and, if the candidate won, they attempt to cement a relationship with the politician. Monitoring occurs at the group level. Politicians expect a certain number of votes at a given polling station and check whether the leader delivered in aggregate terms. Some city councilors, for instance, keep spreadsheets with the expected turnout at specific polling stations.<sup>10</sup> Most politicians do not report engaging in individualized monitoring, such as checking voter identification numbers or attempting to judge vote choice. The importance of these organizational linkages comes out in the comments of local politicians who voice frustration when leaders do not mobilize their members or distribute goods to their members. A common sentiment from politicians was that there were few "true" leaders, and that some leaders "claimed to have much more support than they could mobilize to get more money"<sup>11</sup> or "don't give people the money that candidates provide because they see that they are owed a favor and something for their work."<sup>12</sup>

While aspiring politicians in search of patronage rewards might have filled these roles in a stable party system, they instead fall to organization leaders in the absence of robust party networks. Local leaders are rare actors who can undertake base-level mobilization of their organizations. They are able to extract substantial rewards from politicians because they can negotiate between different politicians and change their alliances across electoral cycles. Leaders have few options to build more durable party ties given party

instability. Of course, not all street-vending leaders act as organizational brokers. Some leaders viewed their work as opposition to the government or social organizing. They complained of the “market for leaders” because it made members skeptical of their attempts to support candidates on ideological grounds.

Street-vending organizations are representative of a broader pattern of “leader buying” in urban Colombia. A wide range of organization leaders connect candidates to blocs of votes, such as those from neighborhood associations (*Juntas de Acción Comunal*) or other civic associations such as teachers unions (Eaton & Chambers-Ju, 2014). More broadly, a 2011 survey by the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) revealed that 27.6% of city residents viewed the purchase of local leaders as the primary type of electoral infraction, followed by the purchase of votes and illegal campaign finance (19.7% and 13.4% of responses, respectively).<sup>13</sup> Ultimately, given the fleeting nature and weakness of parties’ base operations in urban Colombia, the brokerage services of organization leaders are indispensable for clientelism.

## Hybrid Brokers in an Institutionalized Party System

Mexico has a number of examples of hybrid brokers, owing to the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) legacy of corporatist ties with popular-sector organizations during its period of one-party dominance from 1929 to 2000. Under the PRI, labor unions, peasant associations, and other popular-sector organizations were integrated into the hegemonic party state through corporatist ties. These organizations served myriad electoral functions and, in exchange, their leaders were granted positions of political power, exclusive access to state benefits, and privileged policy voice (R. B. Collier, 1992). However, because the PRI monopolized the political sphere, organization leaders were controlled from above and were more accountable to their party patrons than to base members (Fox, 1994). The onset of electoral competition eroded these corporatist practices and gave way to a stable party system in which the PRI faces two main competitors: the right-wing National Action Party (PAN) and the left-wing PRD.

Clientelism continues to be a prominent feature of Mexican elections. Much of this clientelistic distribution operates through networks belonging to popular-sector interest organizations, which parties co-opt, often employing their leaders as electoral brokers. Case studies of urban popular movements, peasant organizations, and teachers unions describe how leaders mobilize their members for elections in exchange for policy influence and distributive benefits (Hilgers, 2008; Holzner, 2004; Larreguy, 2013). Given a stable party

system, leaders can negotiate durable ties to political parties, but then must balance the interests of their members with those of the allied party.

Such hybrid brokerage is particularly prevalent in the Mexican countryside. Party linkages to rural interest organizations date back to the establishment of the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) as the PRI's peasant wing in the 1930s (Mackinlay, 1996). In the 1970s and 1980s, several "dissident" peasant organizations emerged. While these organizations were often formed with no formal party ties and opposed the PRI's co-optation of peasants, many have since opted for exclusive linkages with the PRI or PRD to influence policy and attain state benefits (de Grammont & Mackinlay, 2009). Small-scale farmers continue to see peasant organizations—affiliated either with the PRI or opposition parties—as necessary to access coveted benefits.

Rural hybrid brokers mobilize their members for a single affiliated party. Interviews with brokers suggest that they may not only receive preelectoral goods to turn out their members at campaign events or at the polls but also expect to receive preferential treatment in the allocation of discretionary subsidies and social programs once the party takes office.<sup>14</sup> In exchange for these inducements, organization leaders deploy their networks and the respect that they have built up in their communities to convene rallies and bring voters to the poll, valuable services given the difficulties parties face in constructing base-level organizations in the countryside. Leaders boast that the majority of participants in campaign rallies come on behalf of an organization. A leader of a PRD-affiliated organization explained,

At the campaign marches you can see how many CCC flags there are. Because when we support the party, we support them publicly. When everybody comes out to manifest their support, they say "we're not with (the candidate), we're with the CCC."<sup>15</sup>

When hybrid brokers are successful at mobilizing their members in campaigns, they are allocated increasing shares of party goods. Leaders are eager to demonstrate their *poder de convocatoria*, or ability to draw people to participate in campaigns, because it strengthens their hands in party and base negotiations. These resources reinforce the leader's position, as he can use these goods to recruit new members and to promote member participation. Leaders allocate subsidies to members who show party loyalty, or as the same leader puts it,

If you want me to support you with a subsidy it seems dishonest that you would support the party that punishes us. If you say "I'm a PRIista," go with the PRI and see if they resolve your problem. If you go with the PAN, it's the same.



Because that seems disloyal to me. At the end of the day, you're going to cast your vote. Why not cast it for somebody with whom your organization has an alliance?<sup>16</sup>

Most Mexican states fall into two categories—those that continue to be dominated by the PRI and those where elections are two-party contests between the PRI and the PAN or PRD. Both of these scenarios are conducive to hybrid brokerage, as organization leaders have relative certainty that the party they support will be in a position of power in the foreseeable future. When the prospects of a party take a downturn and resources dry up, organizations sometimes deviate to a more successful party. The state of Michoacán, a historical hotbed of peasant activism, is illustrative. Roughly 30 rural organizations belong to the state's peasant consultative council. During the PRD's two gubernatorial terms (2002-2011), all but two of these organizations supported the PRD and received particularistic benefits for members, preferential access to subsidies, and voice in agricultural policy in return. When the PRI assumed the governorship in 2012, many of these organizations defected. Leaders of the defecting organizations are conscious that this switching comes at a cost—they do not expect to receive the same level of benefits as the PRI's long-term allied organizations.<sup>17</sup> Because political influence and state benefits are so closely tied to party affiliation, however, these leaders chose to throw their support behind the governing party.

Leaders of peasant organizations balance social interests, partisan interests, and rent-seeking interests. Social interests span from particularistic benefits for members, such as small subsidies for capital investments, to local public goods, such as grain storage facilities, and policy considerations, such as the establishment of state development banks. However, providing excludable benefits, which are often received through an affiliated party and allocated to members contingent on participation in elections, is the lifeblood of most peasant organizations. As one leader summarized, "the main purpose of a peasant organization is working through the bureaucracy (*gestión*), fundamentally negotiating for subsidies, funding for development projects, land titles."<sup>18</sup> In our national survey of peasant organizations in Mexico, all 38 organizations surveyed reported having contacted a state or federal ministry to seek information or negotiate about subsidies in the previous year (Palmer-Rubin, 2012). These benefits are indispensable for organizations' recruitment and mobilization efforts. New members join to access subsidies, and leaders allocate subsidies to members who participate in campaign events and other organizational activity to spur collective action and improve their bargaining position.

While organization leaders are loath to admit that partisan interests or personal financial considerations cloud their commitment to the base, their

behavior reflects attention to their own career prospects within the party. Organization leaders often receive nominations for mayoral or legislative posts or hold positions in party leadership. Our survey showed that 69% of peasant organizations reported having a member run for elected office in the previous 5 years. Given leaders' party loyalties, members have reason to doubt that they prioritize collective interests over the party's electoral success or that the leader would switch to a different party that offered greater benefits. Leaders typically conduct negotiations and handle all party contacts personally, and accusations frequently are levied that leaders appropriate party goods for their personal use. Leader accountability to members varies: Several leaders interviewed had been in power for decades and were not subject to reelection.

Accountability to parties creates fewer commitment problems. Most benefits are only delivered after the party assumes office, so the party patron can withhold rewards if the organization fails to mobilize voters. Of course, parties cannot perfectly monitor broker performance, and leaders have incentives to exaggerate the size or partisanship of their membership. However, parties exert substantial control over hybrid brokers because severing party linkages has costs and alternative parties often offer fewer rewards, particularly when the affiliated party is electorally dominant. For instance, one leader complained that the PRD failed to follow through on its promise of nominating him for a winnable state legislature race. Because his organization was strongly associated with the PRD, he preserved the alliance, expecting that his loyalty eventually would be rewarded if the PRD won the election.<sup>19</sup>

Widespread hybrid brokerage in rural Mexico arises from the legacy of rural corporatism combined with the onset of stable multiparty competition. Compared with organizational brokerage—where organization leaders regularly switch parties—hybrid brokers are rewarded for their loyalty to a single party and face obstacles to defection. The limited number of parties and the control of party leaders over patronage benefits reinforce this firm brokerage relationship. As in more volatile party systems, however, organization leaders play a critical role in mobilizing their members and distributing clientelistic benefits.

## Conclusion

In this article, we argue that a focus on interest organizations sheds light on the dynamics of clientelist exchange. Survey evidence reveals that, across a variety of party systems in Latin America, civic participation is a uniquely

strong predictor of exposure to vote buying. We suggest, and support with qualitative evidence, that this relationship stems from the common practice of organization leaders acting as clientelist brokers. Organization leaders often draw on their membership bases to spread candidate information, distribute particularistic and collective goods, and monitor electoral behavior. Parties therefore see organization leaders as attractive allies whose support and accompanying votes can be bought at a price. Organization leaders negotiate with parties not only to extract personal rents but also to secure particularistic and collective goods to mobilize members.

In focusing on the role of collective actors, this article broadens the current research agenda on political brokers to consider a more diverse set of actors beyond party activists or free-floating notables. We develop a typology of brokers that provides a framework for incorporating interest associations into the study of clientelism and synthesize different modes of clientelist exchange documented in dispersed case studies.

While we propose that characteristics of party systems and organizational structure foster different modes of brokerage across countries and subnational units, future research may test the conditions under which each type of broker emerges more systematically. Surveys that probe not only the frequency of vote-buying offers but also who made the offer and the type of good involved (individual or collective) would deepen our knowledge of the form that clientelism takes. Studies of party leaders also may probe the structural conditions and strategic logic that motivate their choices to rely on specific types of brokers. These tasks are important because the degree to which voters can hold politicians and brokers accountable can vary with the characteristics of those who mediate the relationship. Whether changes in the party system or institutional reforms thought to erode clientelism translate into actual reductions also may depend on the ability of party actors to adapt by outsourcing to organization-embedded brokers.

The implications of organizational brokerage for civil society strength and democratic accountability also merit further attention. Several scholars have suggested that clientelism can hinder autonomous organizational activity, therein reducing democratic quality (Fox, 1994; Kurtz, 2004; Levitsky, 2003). In this vein, brokers that lean on civic organizations pose the same risks detailed by classic works on contentious and labor organizations that engage in electoral politics, including leader co-optation, goal displacement, fractionalization, and demobilization (Michels, 1915/1962; Piven & Cloward, 1979; Przeworski & Sprague, 1986; Selznick, 1949). However, clientelism also has the potential to deliver much-needed goods and to reinforce organizational strength (Gay, 1994, 1999; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). The effects

may depend on organizations' internal structures and the degree to which they resist top-down control by the allied party. For organizations that have strong internal mechanisms of leadership accountability and retain the autonomy to engage in demand making outside the electoral realm, clientelist brokerage seems more likely to enhance recruitment and advance collective goals.

To conclude, increased attention to the position of brokers with respect to voters—and specifically to voters incorporated in interest organizations—will pay dividends by improving our understanding of the social and policy consequences of clientelism. Furthermore, it will help align research on clientelism with research on popular-sector interest representation, two areas of inquiry, which, until now, have largely spoken past each other.

## Appendix

### *Variable Construction*

This section provides further details on how we constructed the variables used in the statistical analysis of this article, as well as alternative specifications that we used to check for the robustness of our results.

First, to construct the index of civic participation, we create an additive measure of whether an individual takes part in each of the following activities: community problem solving (*Problem*, on the AmericasBarometer survey, this question is *cp5*); religious organizations (*Religious*, *cp6*); school committees (*School*, *cp7*); community improvement committees (*Improvement*, *cp8*); associations of professionals, sellers, producers, or peasants (*Professional*, *cp9*); and mothers' or housewives' groups (*Mothers*, *cp20*). As such, the index *Civic* ranges from 0 to 6. Below, we also include each civic participation variable separately to check that all indicators have a similar and significant relationship with exposure to vote buying.

While this index measures the breadth of civic participation on the grounds that involvement in any organization raises the chances that an individual will be subject to an offer to buy her vote, it is possible that the intensity of participation is equally important. As a robustness check, we also create an alternative index that scores the frequency of participation. For each of the six types of associations listed above, we code *never attending an association* as 0, *attendance once or twice a year* as 1, *once or twice a month* as 2, and *once a week* as 3. Therefore, this index ranges from 0 to 18. We call this index *Civic Intensity* and confirm that the results are robust to this specification below.

Second, we measure income in two ways due to the known issues of non-response and measurement error on household income questions (for a discussion of the issues associated with income measurement in developing countries, see Deaton (1997), as well as Handlin (2013) for the issues in Latin America specifically). In 2012, AmericasBarometer changed the methodology for measuring household income by increasing the number of household income categories from 10 to 16. To account for this difference, we took the logged midpoint of each income category and then restratified each country-year sample into income deciles. To create the wealth index, we used the series of questions on consumer durables included in the AmericasBarometer questionnaire in a principal components analysis (PCA). These questions ask whether a household has a television (*r1*), refrigerator (*r3*), landline telephone (*r4*), cell phone (*r4a*), car (*r5*), washing machine (*r6*), microwave (*r7*), and computer (*r15*).

Third, to create the partisan index (*Partisan*), we add responses about whether an individual attends meetings of a political party at least once a year (*cp13*) and whether an individual worked for an electoral campaign in the last general election (*pp2*), such that the index runs from no partisan participation (0) to participation in both party meetings and campaigns (2). To measure interest in politics (*Interest*), we measure how much interest individuals profess in politics (*pol1*), running from “none” (0) to “a lot” (2).

The trust question asks whether individuals in the community are “not at all” (0) to “very” (3) trustworthy (*Trust*, on AmericasBarometer, this question is *it1*). The second proxy for reciprocity *Reliability* draws on a series of questions about self-described personality that are scored on a scale from 1 to 7. The questions related to reciprocity ask whether individuals consider themselves “reliable and disciplined” (*per3*) and “generous and caring” (*per7*). We score both as 1 if the person ranks herself as 5 or above on the 7-point scale. The final question asks whether a person considers herself “disorganized and neglectful” (*per8*). We score a person as 1 if she ranks herself as 3 or below.

### Summary Statistics

Table A1 presents the summary statistics for the variables included in the analysis for the pooled LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2010-2012 waves. AmericasBarometer has full regional coverage (around 30,000 observations of adults), and each country survey uses national probability samples of adults. In 2010, the survey asked the relevant question about clientelism

(*clien1*) in 17 countries; in 2012, it only asked the question in 5 countries (Argentina, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Paraguay).<sup>20</sup>

**Table A1.** Summary Statistics.

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Minimum	Maximum	<i>n</i>
<i>Client</i>	0.158	0.365	0	1	36,844
<i>Civic</i>	2.339	1.487	0	6	37,635
<i>Civic Intensity</i>	3.406	2.814	0	18	37,635
<i>Income</i>	4.883	2.920	1	10	30,515
<i>Wealth</i>	5.072	2.864	1	10	37,552
<i>Urban</i>	0.708	0.455	0	1	37,635
<i>Female</i>	0.512	0.500	0	1	37,635
<i>Age</i>	39.10	15.79	18	98	37,359
<i>Education</i>	9.396	4.501	0	29	37,457
<i>Partisan</i>	0.283	0.562	0	2	37,635
<i>Interest</i>	1.132	0.982	0	3	21,930
<i>Trust</i>	1.801	0.920	0	3	36,811
<i>Reliability</i>	2.311	0.692	0	3	37,635

## Results

Given that the results of logistic regressions have no natural interpretation, we present simulated predicted probabilities and confidence intervals in the text. The tables that follow present the full statistical results from a series of logit models. We use logit models given the binary nature of the dependent variable. We report the results from the pooled data with country- and year-fixed effects (not shown).

Table A2 shows the results from the most basic logit models used in the text. Model 1 presents the basic model that includes the civic participation index, income, and a basic set of controls. Model 2 adds the measure of partisan participation and political interest, and Model 3 includes the indicators of trust and reciprocity. We then repeat the three models using the wealth index measure (Models 4–6), rather than income. We see that the results are unchanged when income is measured indirectly through wealth, although the coefficient on wealth does gain significance. Models 7 and 8 show the full model using the civic intensity index as our key independent variable with the same controls and country- and year-fixed effects. Again, the results are unchanged using this alternative specification of our principal independent variable.

**Table A2.** Civic Participation and Exposure to Vote Buying.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Civic</i>	0.274*	0.213*	0.216*	0.283*	0.218*	0.220*		
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
<i>Income</i>	-0.014*	-0.015	-0.013				-0.011	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)				(0.01)	
<i>Urban</i>	0.053	0.038	0.014	0.108*	0.096	0.071	-0.010	0.047
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
<i>Female</i>	0.011	0.013	0.017	-0.006	0.001	0.001	-0.182*	-0.202*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
<i>Age</i>	-0.012*	-0.014*	-0.013*	-0.012*	-0.013*	-0.012*	-0.012*	-0.012*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<i>Education</i>	-0.006	-0.013*	-0.010	-0.002	-0.006	-0.003	-0.010	-0.002
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>Partisan</i>		0.522*	0.523*		0.505*	0.503*	0.550*	0.531*
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
<i>Interest</i>		0.107*	0.114*		0.107*	0.113*	0.115*	0.116*
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
<i>Trust</i>			-0.128*			-0.128*	-0.129*	-0.128*
			(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
<i>Reliability</i>			-0.126*			-0.123*	-0.132*	-0.127*
			(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
<i>Wealth</i>				-0.050*	-0.050*	-0.049*		-0.049*
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)
<i>Civic Intensity</i>							0.098*	0.098*
							(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>n</i>	24,165	19,323	18,961	30,135	21,375	20,942	18,961	20,942
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.066	.075	.079	.075	.075	.079	.077	.076

Source. Pooled AmericasBarometer 2010 and 2012 data

Country- and year-fixed effects not shown.

\* $p < .05$ . Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A3 disaggregates the civic participation index by type of association and finds that almost all the coefficients are positive and significant. The robustness of the results to alternative measures of civic participation and across types of organizations increases our confidence that organizational participation has an important association with exposure to vote buying.

**Table A3.** Disaggregated Civic Participation and Exposure to Vote Buying.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Problem</i>	0.168* (0.03)	0.137* (0.03)	0.136* (0.03)	0.182* (0.03)	0.156* (0.03)	0.158* (0.03)
<i>Religious</i>	0.078* (0.02)	0.079* (0.02)	0.085* (0.02)	0.075* (0.02)	0.075* (0.02)	0.082* (0.02)
<i>School</i>	0.078* (0.03)	0.061* (0.03)	0.055 (0.03)	0.109* (0.03)	0.095* (0.03)	0.094* (0.03)
<i>Improvement</i>	0.149* (0.04)	0.087* (0.04)	0.097* (0.04)	0.145* (0.03)	0.092* (0.03)	0.102* (0.03)
<i>Professional</i>	0.231* (0.05)	0.182* (0.05)	0.175* (0.05)	0.200* (0.04)	0.153* (0.04)	0.138* (0.04)
<i>Mothers</i>	0.113* (0.04)	0.075* (0.04)	0.076 (0.04)	0.093* (0.03)	0.059 (0.03)	0.058 (0.03)
<i>Income</i>	-0.013 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)			
<i>Urban</i>	0.177* (0.07)	0.165* (0.07)	0.158* (0.07)	0.221* (0.06)	0.205* (0.06)	0.206* (0.06)
<i>Female</i>	-0.179 (0.14)	-0.133 (0.14)	-0.124 (0.14)	-0.179 (0.13)	-0.139 (0.13)	-0.133 (0.13)
<i>Age</i>	-0.014* (0.00)	-0.014* (0.00)	-0.013* (0.00)	-0.012* (0.00)	-0.012* (0.00)	-0.011* (0.00)
<i>Education</i>	-0.023* (0.01)	-0.028* (0.01)	-0.027* (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)	-0.016* (0.01)	-0.014* (0.01)
<i>Partisan</i>		0.633* (0.04)	0.648* (0.04)		0.574* (0.04)	0.581* (0.04)
<i>Trust</i>			-0.054 (0.03)			-0.022 (0.03)
<i>Reliability</i>			-0.124* (0.04)			-0.116* (0.04)
<i>Consumption</i>				-0.070* (0.01)	-0.066* (0.01)	-0.066* (0.01)
<i>n</i>	12,518	12,518	12,261	15,547	15,547	15,181
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.067	.085	.088	.075	.090	.091

Source. Pooled AmericasBarometer 2010 and 2012 data  
Country- and year-fixed effects not shown.

\*p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses.

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### Notes

1. A number of scholars acknowledge that local public goods provided contingent on group electoral behaviors classify as clientelist benefits (Abente Brun & Diamond, 2014; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Nichter, 2014).
2. For a review, see Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco (2013, pp. 158-171).
3. These data are available at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/>
4. The exact question wording is as follows: "In recent years and thinking about election campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in return for your vote?"
5. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are calculated using the software Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, & King, 2003).
6. Brokers who are embedded in well-defined ethnic groups or tight-knit communities can be motivated by a social interest and operate analogously to organization-embedded brokers.
7. Author's focus group with vending leaders, September 11, 2011, *Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Colombia* (CUT), Bogotá, Colombia.
8. Author interview with anonymous vending leader, Locality of Usme, Bogotá, Colombia, September 15, 2011.
9. Author interview anonymous vending leader, Locality of Suba, Bogotá, Colombia, September 21, 2011.
10. Author interview with Yezid García, City Councilor, Bogotá, Colombia, September 15, 2011.
11. Author interview with Dagberto Reyes Castillo, Local Councilor, Locality of Engativá, Bogotá, Colombia, August 30, 2011.

12. Author interview with Juan Carlos Tavera, Local Councilor, Locality of San Cristobal, Bogotá, Colombia, October 12, 2011.
13. Electoral Observation Mission (MOE), "Percepción electoral de los votantes en Colombia."
14. Author interviews with Primitivo Ávalos, Coordinator of El Surco-Michoacán, November 8, 2012; Valerio Celaya, Adviser for Productive Projects for Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de México (UGOCM)-Jacinto López-Michoacán, August 16, 2012; Vicente Estrada Torres, Secretary of Political Operations for *Confederación Nacional Campesina* (CNC)-Michoacán, January 26, 2012; Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, Secretary-General of Central Campesina Cardenista (CCC)-Jalisco, June 6, 2012.
15. Author interview with Miguel Ángel Rodríguez.
16. Author interview with Miguel Ángel Rodríguez.
17. Author meeting observations and interviews with Omar Lando Espinoza, Director of *Red de Empresas Comercializadoras Campesinas de Michoacán* (RedCCAM), December 9, 2011; Marco Rodríguez, Technical Secretary of *Consejo Consultivo de Organizaciones Campesinas de Michoacán* (COCOCAM), January 24, 2012; Vicente Estrada Torres, Secretary of Political Operations for *Confederación Nacional Campesina* (CNC)-Michoacán, January 26, 2012.
18. Author interview with Primitivo Ávalos.
19. Author interview with Carlos González López, Secretary-General of CCC-Michoacán, December 14, 2011.
20. We exclude English-speaking countries (Jamaica, Guyana, and Belize); Honduras has no data on clientelism for the 2010 and 2012 waves.

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