

# Appendix A: Reproducing Analysis Using Declared Interest Measure of Outcome


This appendix reproduces Tables 2, 3, and 4 and Figure 3 using the declared interest measure of the outcome variable (expressing interest in participating) rather than the behavioral measure (providing phone number). Table 1 in the main text already displays both the declared interest and behavioral measures for the four treatment conditions using the full sample. As discussed, we focus on the behavioral measure in the main body of the text because we believe that it is a more faithful measure of the respondent’s interest in participating in the organization. There are some notable differences in results across the two outcome measures. For instance, none of the treatment conditions yielded a significant positive estimate for members using the declared interest measure (Table 1 below), while using the behavioral outcome measure, the subsidies treatment yielded a significant positive effect for members (Table 2 in the manuscript). Conversely, the magnitude of the estimate for the subsidies treatment for non-members is larger with the declared interest measure than with the behavioral measure. Similarly, the conditional average treatment effect of the subsidies treatment for *high-income* members is not significant using the declared interest measure, but is quite large and significant using the behavioral measure.

Table 1: Members vs. Non-Members (Declared Interest Measure)

	Members	Non-Members
Subsidies	2.2% (70.5%)	11.9%** (56.5%)
Public Goods	-8.2% (60.0%)	8.2%* (52.8%)
Services	0.7% (68.9%)	3.6% (48.2%)
Peer Esteem	-18.6% (49.6%)	-0.2% (44.4%)
Control	68.2%	44.6%

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ ; Members  $N = 624$ ; Non-Members  $N = 749$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Figure 1: Members vs. Non-Members (Declared Interest Measure)



Note: Figure displays conditional average treatment effects and 90% confidence intervals.

Table 2: Low-Income vs. High-Income by Membership (Declared Interest Measure)

	Low-Income		High-Income	
	Members	Non-Members	Members	Non-Members
Subsidies	11.4%* (77.0%)	11.0% (62.9%)	-1.5% (75.0%)	-3.7% (55.4%)
Public Goods	-4.0% (61.7%)	-1.9% (50.0%)	-15.6% (60.9%)	7.1% (66.1%)
Services	14.8%** (80.4%)	-0.3% (51.6%)	-12.8% (63.6%)	-3.9% (55.1%)
Peer Esteem	-4.3% (61.4%)	-1.9% (50.0%)	-32.0% (44.4%)	-9.0% (50.0%)
Control	65.6%	51.9%	76.5%	59.0%
<i>N</i>	275	292	252	298

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Table 3: Distinct Types of Organization Members (Declared Interest Measure)

	Unions	Peasant Assoc.	Neighborhood	Business
Subsidies	-9.8% (67.8%)	-0.3% (74.1%)	1.5% (72.4%)	-24.6% (60.0%)
Public Goods	-18.4% (59.3%)	-5.8% (68.6%)	-13.5% (57.4%)	-24.6% (60.0%)
Services	-8.4% (69.2%)	7.4% (81.8%)	3.2% (74.1%)	-6.8% (77.8)
Peer Esteem	-24.8% (52.9%)	-9.6% (64.9%)	-10.9% (60.0%)	-56.0% (28.6%)
Control	77.6%	74.4%	70.9%	84.6%
<i>N</i>	302	218	292	54

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

## Appendix B: Reproducing Analysis for Personal Rather than Social Network Membership

This appendix reproduces Tables 2, 3, and 4 from the main analysis using a more restrictive definition of organization members as those who personally belong to an organization. The main analysis additionally includes in the “members” category those who have a family member, neighbor, or friend who belongs to the type of organization in question. Results in this appendix are quite consistent with main findings, reflecting a) a greater overall interest in joining by members; b) larger estimates for the “subsidies” treatment for members and for the “public goods” treatment for non-members; and c) a more pronounced tendency for subsidies among *high-income members* and for public goods among *high-income non-members*. Significance levels decline due to the smaller sample size for members.

Table 4: Members vs. Non-Members (Only Personal Membership)

	Interested in Joining		Offer Phone Number	
	Members	Non-Members	Members	Non-Members
Subsidies	1.0% (70.8%)	8.2%** (59.6%)	11.9%* (38.9%)	10.2%** (36.0%)
Public Goods	-10.6% (59.2%)	3.8% (52.8%)	4.6% (31.6%)	10.3%** (36.1%)
Services	-7.1% (62.7%)	3.0% (54.4%)	-7.8% (31.6%)	4.1% (29.9%)
Peer Esteem	-17.4% (52.5%)	-6.4% (45.0%)	2.5% (29.5%)	-1.5% (24.3%)
Control	69.8%	51.4%	27.0%	25.8%

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ ; Members N = 323; Non-Members N = 1,076. For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Table 5: Low-Income vs. High-Income by Membership (Only Personal Membership), Offer Phone Number

	Low-Income		High-Income	
	Members	Non-Members	Members	Non-Members
Subsidies	11.1% (35.3%)	8.7% (37.6%)	12.7% (51.8%)	4.2% (40.0%)
Public Goods	8.3% (32.5%)	1.3% (30.3%)	-7.1% (32.0%)	16.1%** (51.9%)
Services	-6.1% (18.2%)	4.4% (33.3%)	12.8% (26.3%)	-5.5% (30.3%)
Peer Esteem	13.9% (38.1%)	-3.3% (25.6%)	-10.1% (29.0%)	-8.2% (27.6%)
Control	24.2%	28.9%	39.1%	35.8%
<i>N</i>	150	428	125	442

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Table 6: Distinct Types of Organization Members, Offer Phone Number (Only Personal Membership)

	Unions	Peasant Assoc.	Neighborhood	Business
Subsidies	-5.6% (35.3%)	3.8% (43.8%)	19.0% (42.1%)	25.0% (25.0%)
Public Goods	-10.9% (30.0%)	-3.6% (36.4%)	3.6% (26.7%)	33.3% (33.3%)
Services	-7.6% (33.3%)	-18.6% (21.4%)	-12.6% (10.5%)	NA (NA)
Peer Esteem	-4.1% (36.8%)	-9.2% (30.7%)	24.0% (47.1%)	0.0% (0.0%)
Control	40.9%	40.0%	23.1%	0.0%
<i>N</i>	96	85	83	11

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

## Appendix C: Reproducing Analysis for Alternative Measures of Income/Class

This appendix reproduces Table 3 from the main analysis using alternative measures for social class rather than the household income measure. These include a measure of the respondent's household's income relative to the state-specific median for Chiapas (2,200 pesos) or Mexico City (4,450 pesos), as opposed to median for the pooled sample (Table 7); respondent's level of education, based on a median value of having completed secondary education and no more schooling (Table 8); and whether the electoral section for the respondent (the lowest level of aggregation available) is above or below the median in household occupancy rate (1.1 inhabitants per room), a measure of poverty (Table 9). We additionally reproduce analysis dividing between respondents residing in urban or rural municipalities, based on living in municipalities with populations over or under 50,000 (Table 10). Household occupancy rate and municipal population were calculated from data provided by INEGI, Mexico's statistical bureau. Across all measures of class/income, results are consistent with the main findings. Among the higher-class groups (high income, high education, or low poverty rates), estimates for members are strongest for the subsidies treatment and estimates for non-members are strongest for the public goods treatment.

Figure 2 displays results from a sensitivity analysis replacing the dichotomous measure of income with the 17-level ordinal measure of income recorded in the survey. The figure displays marginal effects for the behavioral outcome regressed on this ordinal measure of income on subgroups corresponding to organization members and non-members. Results here are consistent with main findings. The two subgroup analyses that yield significant relationships are for members in the subsidies and peer esteem treatment groups. Higher-income organization members are significantly *more* likely to respond to the subsidies treatment than lower-income members, while higher-income members are significantly *less* likely to respond to the peer esteem treatment than non-members.

Table 7: Low-Income vs. High-Income (State-Based Measure) by Membership

	Low-Income		High-Income	
	Members	Non-Members	Members	Non-Members
Subsidies	13.2%* (40.7%)	9.7% (31.7%)	21.3%** (58.2%)	-0.7% (30.9%)
Public Goods	-0.8% (26.8%)	14.2%** (36.2%)	2.4% (39.2%)	20.3%** (51.9%)
Services	-3.7% (23.9%)	8.5% (30.6%)	4.5% (41.3%)	-3.7% (27.9%)
Peer Esteem	11.1% (38.6%)	-1.4% (20.6%)	-8.3% (28.6%)	-5.0% (26.5%)
Control	27.6%	22.0%	36.8%	31.6%
<i>N</i>	258	315	272	278

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Table 8: Low-Education vs. High-Education by Membership

	Low-Education		High-Education	
	Members	Non-Members	Members	Non-Members
Subsidies	10.9% (35.1%)	9.4% (33.8%)	20.3%** (55.2%)	-3.5% (27.4%)
Public Goods	4.1% (28.4%)	1.8% (26.2%)	0.2% (35.1%)	16.6%** (47.4%)
Services	6.9% (31.1%)	5.4% (29.8%)	-7.3% (27.7%)	-6.5% (24.4%)
Peer Esteem	3.3% (27.6%)	-9.7% (14.7%)	-3.0% (31.9%)	-4.4% (26.5%)
Control	24.2%	24.4%	34.9%	30.9%
<i>N</i>	333	376	294	371

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Table 9: High-Poverty vs. Low-Poverty Section (Based on Occupancy Rate) by Membership

	High-Poverty		Low-Poverty	
	Members	Non-Members	Members	Non-Members
Subsidies	12.2%* (40.3%)	-1.2% (26.9%)	17.2%** (49.1%)	2.9% (32.6%)
Public Goods	7.8% (35.8%)	2.1% (30.2%)	-7.9% (24.0%)	12.0%** (41.8%)
Services	4.2% (32.3%)	-0.5% (27.6%)	-5.8% (26.1%)	-2.6% (27.2%)
Peer Esteem	5.3% (33.3%)	-12.5% (15.6%)	-8.0% (23.9%)	-4.8% (25.0%)
Control	28.0%	28.1%	31.9%	29.8%
<i>N</i>	383	320	244	432

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.


Table 10: Rural vs. Urban Municipality (&lt;50K Population) by Membership

	Rural		Urban	
	Members	Non-Members	Members	Non-Members
Subsidies	12.1% (41.3%)	9.2% (31.0%)	15.7%** (45.3%)	3.8% (30.5%)
Public Goods	4.2% (33.3%)	24.3%** (46.1%)	0.5% (30.1%)	8.9%* (35.6%)
Services	5.1% (34.3%)	11.5% (33.3%)	-2.2% (27.4%)	-0.7% (25.9%)
Peer Esteem	7.6% (36.7%)	-13.9% (8.0%)	-4.0% (25.6%)	-3.1% (23.5%)
Control	29.2%	21.9%	29.6%	26.7%
<i>N</i>	226	145	401	607

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.



Figure 2: Class and Organization Membership Using Ordinal Measure of Income



Note: Graphs display conditional average treatment effects of income on the behavioral outcome measure dividing the sample into organization members and non-members for each treatment condition. Shaded bands display 95 percent confidence intervals. Jittering was used to distinguish scores on the discrete income measure along the x-axis.

## Appendix D: Reproducing Analysis for Chiapas and Mexico City Separately

This appendix reproduces tables from the main analysis on separate subsamples for Chiapas and Mexico City. Overall findings are quite consistent, with some loss of statistical significance due to smaller sample sizes. The subsidies treatment remains significant and the public goods treatment has a stronger effect in Mexico City, particularly among non-members.

Table 11: Overall Findings, Chiapas

	Interested in Joining	Offer Phone Number
Subsidies	6.9% (67.6%)	9.5%* (38.7%)
Public Goods	-2.0% (58.7%)	4.7% (34.0%)
Services	4.5% (65.2%)	2.9% (32.2%)
Peer Esteem	-7.5% (53.2%)	-1.6% (27.7%)
Control	60.7%	29.3%

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ ;  $N = 704$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Table 12: Overall Findings, Mexico City

	Interested in Joining	Offer Phone Number
Subsidies	6.6% (57.3%)	9.1%** (34.4%)
Public Goods	2.6% (53.3%)	12.6%** (38.0%)
Services	-3.9% (46.8%)	-1.9% (23.4%)
Peer Esteem	-11.1% (39.6%)	-0.9% (24.5%)
Control	50.7%	25.4%

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ ;  $N = 698$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Table 13: Low-Income vs. High-Income, Chiapas

	Interested in Joining		Offer Phone Number	
	Low-Income	High-Income	Low-Income	High-Income
Subsidies	16.9%** (75.0%)	-5.1% (66.0%)	10.9% (36.7%)	4.6% (45.3%)
Public Goods	0.8% (58.8%)	-3.8% (67.4%)	11.0% (36.8%)	-2.4% (38.3%)
Services	11.6%* (69.6%)	-2.9% (68.3%)	4.7% (30.5%)	-3.0% (37.7%)
Peer Esteem	0.3% (58.3%)	-13.8% (57.4%)	7.5% (33.3%)	-11.0% (29.6%)
Control	58.1%	71.2%	25.8%	40.7%

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ ; Low-Income N = 306; High-Income N = 272. For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Table 14: Low-Income vs. High-Income, Mexico City

	Interested in Joining		Offer Phone Number	
	Low-Income	High-Income	Low-Income	High-Income
Subsidies	2.1% (61.0%)	16.5%** (63.9%)	4.8% (33.3%)	17.6%** (44.3%)
Public Goods	-10.0% (48.9%)	15.3%** (62.7%)	-0.9% (27.7%)	29.3%*** (55.9%)
Services	-6.5% (52.4%)	3.6% (51.1%)	-4.8% (23.8%)	1.0% (27.7%)
Peer Esteem	-16.9% (42.0%)	-5.5% (41.9%)	-2.6% (26.0%)	-0.9% (25.8%)
Control	58.9%	47.5%	28.6%	26.7%

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ ; Low-Income N = 275; High-Income N = 288. For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Table 15: Members vs. Non-Members, Chiapas

	Interested in Joining		Offer Phone Number	
	Members	Non-Members	Members	Non-Members
Subsidies	2.2%	13.7%*	13.1%*	3.4%
	(69.4%)	(65.5%)	(42.4%)	(32.7%)
Public Goods	-1.9%	-1.7%	4.1%	7.2%
	(65.2%)	(50.0%)	(33.3%)	(36.5%)
Services	4.8%	7.2%	2.5%	2.7%
	(71.9%)	(58.9%)	(31.8%)	(32.0%)
Peer Esteem	-11.0%	-2.6%	2.4%	-8.3%
	(56.1%)	(49.1%)	(31.7%)	(21.1%)
Control	67.1%	51.7%	29.3%	29.3%

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ ; Members N = 402; Non-Members N = 295. For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Table 16: Members vs. Non-Members, Mexico City

	Interested in Joining		Offer Phone Number	
	Members	Non-Members	Members	Non-Members
Subsidies	2.1%	11.1%*	12.8%	8.5%*
	(72.3%)	(51.1%)	(46.8%)	(29.3%)
Public Goods	-21.4%	14.3%**	-7.2%	19.3%***
	(48.8%)	(54.3%)	(26.8%)	(40.2%)
Services	-5.9%	-0.2%	-7.9%	2.8%
	(64.3%)	(39.8%)	(26.2%)	(23.7%)
Peer Esteem	-32.4%	1.4%	-7.4%	2.1%
	(37.8%)	(41.4%)	(26.7%)	(23.0%)
Control	70.2%	40.0%	34.0%	20.9%

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ ; Members N = 222; Non-Members N = 454. For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Table 17: Low-Income vs. High-Income by Membership, Chiapas

	Low-Income		High-Income	
	Members	Non-Members	Members	Non-Members
Subsidies	8.6% (41.9%)	16.8%* (32.1%)	21.9%** (54.3%)	1.3% (23.5%)
Public Goods	-4.4% (28.9%)	32.9%** (48.3%)	8.7% (41.2%)	11.1% (33.3%)
Services	-9.2% (24.1%)	21.3%** (36.7%)	15.7% (48.1%)	7.2% (29.4%)
Peer Esteem	11.5% (44.8%)	7.2% (22.6%)	-1.9% (30.6%)	2.8% (25.0%)
Control	33.3%	15.4%	32.4%	22.2%
<i>N</i>	163	144	169	101

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

Table 18: Low-Income vs. High-Income by Membership, Mexico City

	Low-Income		High-Income	
	Members	Non-Members	Members	Non-Members
Subsidies	11.9% (39.1%)	4.1% (31.4%)	20.0% (65.0%)	-11.5% (34.2%)
Public Goods	-5.1% (22.2%)	3.8% (31.0%)	-9.7% (35.3%)	11.8% (57.5%)
Services	-3.7% (23.5%)	-1.1% (26.2%)	-13.4% (31.6%)	-19.8% (25.9%)
Peer Esteem	-0.6% (26.7%)	-2.3% (25.0%)	-19.1% (25.9%)	-18.4% (27.3%)
Control	27.3%	27.3%	45.0%	45.7%
<i>N</i>	95	171	103	177

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . For each treatment condition, the top number is the conditional average treatment effect and the bottom number is the raw proportion responding affirmatively. P-values correspond to differences between the treatment condition and control in same column on one-tailed t-test.

## Appendix E: Checks for Randomization and Sampling Bias

Table 19 compares the randomly assigned treatment (and control) groups for balance on observable covariates. Estimates are marked with stars for statistical significance based on comparisons between the highest and lowest values in a given row. Overall, five of the covariates yielded differences at the 90 percent level of significance between at least one pair of treatment groups. However, this is not surprising given that these findings are based on 140 total comparisons (ten comparisons for each of 14 covariates).

Table 20 compares our sample to alternative measures of Chiapas, Mexico City, and Mexico as a whole on several covariates to validate the representativeness of our sample. For the national sample, we present both official government data generated by Mexico’s statistical bureau (INEGI) and electoral institute (INE) as well as results from the 2016/2017 LAPOP survey (LAPOP 2017). Our sample is somewhat older than the national average in the administrative data, but in line with results from the LAPOP survey. This difference is largely due to the fact that our survey (much like LAPOP) only targeted adults that were at least 18 years old; the administrative data provided by INEGI on the other hand includes all residents, irrespective of age. Our sample also skews slightly towards lower income than the national average, mainly owing to the fact that half of our sample is from Chiapas, one of Mexico’s poorest states. A slightly higher proportion of our respondents reported voting for the PRI’s candidates for federal deputy in 2015 than shown in official election results for Mexico City and Chiapas. However, the proportion that reported voting the PRI in our pooled sample (24.6 percent) was slightly lower than the national average that year (30.0 percent). This is mainly due to the inclusion of Mexico City, the subnational unit that consistently has the lowest vote shares for the PRI. The proportion of our sample that are beneficiaries of Prospera (Mexico’s conditional cash transfer program)—23.5%—is quite close to the national average (20.2%) as measured by LAPOP. The vast majority of beneficiaries in our sample were from Chiapas, where over 40 percent of respondents reported receiving support from this program, compared to 3.8 percent in Mexico City.

Table 19: Comparing Treatment Groups on Covariates

Variable	Control	Subsidies	Public Goods	Services	Peer Esteem
<i>Socio-Demographic Traits</i>					
Mexico City	.504	.505	.488	.496	.496
Female	.489	.535*	.462	.500	.496
Age	43.1**	40.3	40.2	41.0	39.8
Rural	.284	.265	.263	.240	.264
Income	9.22	8.79	8.80	8.75	9.42
Education	5.55	5.47	5.71	5.49	5.63
Informal Sector	.396	.411	.413	.404	.399
<i>Political Traits</i>					
Org. Member	.464	.473	.476***	.391	.469
Protest/Rally Part.	.264	.331	.250	.283	.279
Voted in 2015	.715***	.655	.653	.635	.604
Partisan	.561	.565*	.538	.486	.538
PRI Partisan	.145	.157	.132	.113	.136
Beneficiary	.505	.476	.457	.498	.479
Clientelism	.413*	.372	.335	.363	.387
<i>N</i>	282	287	281	284	280

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . P-values correspond to differences between highest and lowest value for a given covariate on two-tailed t-test.

Table 20: Comparing Sample to Alternative Measures on Covariates

Variable	Mexico City (Sample)	Mexico City (Gov.)	Chiapas (Sample)	Chiapas (Gov.)	Pooled (Sample)	National (Gov.)	National (LAPOP)
Female	49.1%	52.6%	50.3%	51.4%	49.7%	51.4%	49.6%
Age	42	33	40	23	41	27	40
Rural	0%	0.5%	52.5%	51%	26.3%	22.2%	20.0%
Income	4,276	6,590	2,475	2,209	3,476	4,134	4,300
Education	10.2	11.1	9.0	7.3	9.6	9.2	9.4
Turnout (2015)	64.1%	44.2%	66.5%	46.3%	65.3%	47.7%	68.2%*
PRI Share (2015)	16.6%	11.9%	31.9%	24.7%	24.6%	30.0%	31.3%*
Prospera Ben.	3.8%	–	41.5%	–	23.5%	–	20.2%

\* The vote variables (turnout and PRI vote share) reported from the LAPOP data refer to self-reported vote behavior in 2012 (LAPOP, 2017). Sources of government data: Female, Age, Education (INEGI, 2015*a,b*, 2017*a,b*); Rural (INEGI, 2010); Income (INEGI, 2019); Turnout (INE, 2015*a*); PRI Share (INE, 2015*b*).



## Appendix F: Control and Treatment Fliers

# Lazos Comunitarios



*¡Únase a Lazos Comunitarios,  
trabajando juntos por la  
comunidad!*

[www.lazosac.org.mx](http://www.lazosac.org.mx)

# Lazos Comunitarios

Gestión de recursos del gobierno:

- PROYECTOS PRODUCTIVOS
- SUBSIDIOS DE VIVIENDA




*¡Únase a Lazos, trabajando juntos  
por la comunidad!*

[www.lazosac.org.mx](http://www.lazosac.org.mx)

# Lazos Comunitarios

Lucha para mejor espacios públicos:

- PARQUES SEGUROS Y LIMPIOS
- CALLES SIN BACHES




*¡Únase a Lazos, trabajando juntos  
por la comunidad!*

[www.lazosac.org.mx](http://www.lazosac.org.mx)

# Lazos Comunitarios

Ofrece talleres a sus miembros de:

- COMUNICACIÓN Y LIDERAZGO
- MANEJO DE ÍNGLES



*¡Únase a Lazos, trabajando juntos  
por la comunidad!*

[www.lazosac.org.mx](http://www.lazosac.org.mx)

# Lazos Comunitarios

Muchos miembros de su  
comunidad ya están participando



*¡Únase a Lazos, trabajando juntos  
por la comunidad!*

[www.lazosac.org.mx](http://www.lazosac.org.mx)

## References

- INE. 2015*a*. “Participación Ciudadana en Elecciones Locales.”. Instituto Nacional Electoral, <http://siceef.ine.mx/campc.html?p%C3%A1gina=1>.
- INE. 2015*b*. “Votos por Partido Político en Elecciones Locales.”. Instituto Nacional Electoral, <http://siceef.ine.mx/atlas.html?p%C3%A1gina=1#siceen>.
- INEGI. 2010. “Población rural y urbana (Número de habitantes).” . Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, [https://apps1.semarnat.gob.mx:8443/dgeia/compendio\\_2016/archivos/04\\_demografia/D1\\_DEMOGRAF01\\_02\\_D.pdf](https://apps1.semarnat.gob.mx:8443/dgeia/compendio_2016/archivos/04_demografia/D1_DEMOGRAF01_02_D.pdf).
- INEGI. 2015*a*. “Estructura nacional (básica). Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía.”. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, <https://www.inegi.org.mx/temas/estructura>.
- INEGI. 2015*b*. “Hombres y mujeres en México. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía.”. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, <http://cuentame.inegi.org.mx/poblacion/mujeresyhombres.aspx?tema=P>.
- INEGI. 2017*a*. “Población Total por demarcación territorial según sexo para Chiapas.”. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, [https://www.inegi.org.mx/app/cuadroentidad/Chis/2018/03/3\\_2](https://www.inegi.org.mx/app/cuadroentidad/Chis/2018/03/3_2).
- INEGI. 2017*b*. “Población Total por demarcación territorial según sexo para Ciudad de México.”. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, [https://www.inegi.org.mx/app/cuadroentidad/CDMX/2018/03/3\\_2](https://www.inegi.org.mx/app/cuadroentidad/CDMX/2018/03/3_2).
- INEGI. 2019. “El INEGI da a conocer los resultados de la encuesta nacional de ingresos y gastos de los hogares (ENIGH) 2018.”. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, [https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2019/EstSociodemo/enigh2019\\_07.pdf](https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2019/EstSociodemo/enigh2019_07.pdf).
- LAPOP. 2017. “The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).” . [www.LapopSurveys.org](http://www.LapopSurveys.org).