

Online Appendix

Appendix A: Organizational Survey

The National Survey of Economic Interest Organizations in Mexico was carried out between September and December 2012 and applied to elected presidents or hired directors of organizations belonging to Mexico's two largest confederations of business chambers—the Confederation of the National Chambers of Commerce (CONCANACO) and the National Chamber of the Manufacturing Industry (CANACINTRA)—and two prominent confederations of “dissident” agricultural organizations—Cardenista Peasant Central (CCC) and National Association of Commercializing Firms of Rural Producers (ANEC). I used three criteria to choose these confederations: First, all members organizations are primarily made up of micro- and small-scale farmers or business owners, and thus classify as “non-elite.” Second, the confederations are all national in scope and have state-level affiliates in the majority of Mexican states. And third, the confederations exhibit internal variation in the political orientation of composite organizations (in contrast with the National Peasant Confederation, Mexico's largest rural organization, which is formally incorporated into the PRI). Response rates and state coverage for the survey are reported in the table below. Mexico has 31 states, plus the Federal District (Mexico City). As shown, participants in the survey came from 31 states.

The survey for business organizations was implemented online; all member organizations of these two confederations were emailed a link from confederation staff to an online survey that I designed using Qualtrics. Agricultural organizations were surveyed using a printed questionnaire that I distributed to leaders of these organizations at periodic national

Survey Response Rate by Confederation and Sector

Confederation	Total Org's in Confed.	Sample (w/ inc.)	Response Rate	States	Sample (complete)	Response Rate	States
CONCANACO	250	74	29.6%	28	45	18.0%	21
CANACINTRA	79	30	38.0%	18	9	11.4%	7
<i>TOTAL BUS.</i>	<i>329</i>	<i>104</i>	<i>31.6%</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>16.4%</i>	<i>22</i>
CCC	31	24	77.4%	19	21	67.7%	17
ANEC	16	11	68.8%	9	10	62.5%	8
<i>TOTAL AG.</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>74.5%</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>66.0%</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>TOTAL ORG'S</i>	<i>379</i>	<i>139</i>	<i>36.7%</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>85</i>	<i>22.4%</i>	<i>28</i>

Note: “Sample (w/ inc.)” refers to all organizations that participated in the survey, including those with incomplete responses. This sample was used for main analysis; sample sizes vary in multivariate analysis according to number of respondents that completed outcome measures. “Sample (complete)” refers to organizations with complete responses to all items in multivariate analysis. This sample is used for sensitivity analysis in Appendix D.

meetings. As top elected officials and directors of operations, these figures were uniquely positioned to serve as informants about their organizations, although as discussed below the division of labor between executive leadership and day-to-day operations likely led to non-response to several survey items. The different modes were implemented to maximize response rates: while business organization leaders frequently use the internet in their daily operations, many leaders of agriculture organizations are less comfortable with this medium. The agricultural and business survey instruments included 39 and 54 items, respectively. The median response time for completed online surveys was approximately 18 minutes. The surveys were divided into three sections: (1) organizational traits, such as membership, revenue sources, services, and leadership; (2) political participation, including frequency and goals of engaging in electoral politics, protest, media campaigns, and contacting politicians and bureaucrats; (3) access to distributive programs, including frequency of applying for and receiving subsidies and social benefits from different government entities. Survey instru-

ments, data, and R code used in analysis will be made available on the author's webpage upon publication.

Several respondents did not complete the entire survey. In particular, this occurred for many business organizations when the respondent was an elected leader who was able to answer questions about political participation and demand-making, but less aware of organizational statistics (e.g., number of members, sources of income). The models in the body of the paper impute missing values for the four organizational traits (Resource Flows, Member Services, Percent Micro Members, and Number of Members), using sectoral medians. Analysis in Appendix D replicates main findings using samples that exclude all units with incomplete data on these variables, with consistent findings. I did not impute values for any component measures of outcomes (participation or demand-making indices). Thus, the sample size for the models in Table 2 vary based on the number of respondents with complete responses to these survey items.

Non-response bias is potentially an issue, as sampling of respondents was not random. Non-participants in the survey include those who either did not respond to the email from the confederation (business) or did not attend national confederation meetings (agriculture). Thus, we might expect non-participants to have lower organizational capacity or looser ties to the confederations than participants. However, it is difficult to venture a prediction of how non-response may have produced bias in outcome measures (participation and demand-making indices). If anything, I might speculate that those who responded are more participatory overall, and thus would score higher across all the participation indices than non-responders. Given that the model's predictions have less to do with *how much* participation than with *what kind* of participation (institutional, electoral, or extra-institutional),

it is unlikely that the internal validity of the main findings is threatened by non-response bias among organizations in these four sectors. On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind the non-random nature of sampling when interpreting the generalizability of results. As shown in Appendix B, however, the respondents included exhibit quite high variation across measured organizational traits such as number of members, number of employees, class composition, and frequency of holding meetings.

Appendix B: Summary Statistics of Organizational Traits

Variable	Measures Used	Agricultural Org's					Business Org's				
		Min	Mean	Max	SD	<i>N</i>	Min	Mean	Max	SD	<i>N</i>
<i>Independent Variables, Control</i>											
Resource Flows	Diversity of funding; count of: (1) membership fees; (2) donations from the confederation; (3) commission for subsidies; (4) payments for services; (5) other lucrative activity	0	2.4	5	1.2	32	0	2.6	5	1.2	57
Member Services	Number of services offered to members; count of: (1) consulting or project design; (2) access to credit; (3) helping access government programs; (4) providing information about market conditions or politics; (5) other service	2	4.2	5	0.9	34	1	3.0	5	1.1	64
Class Composition	% of members that belong to the “micro” classification (agriculture: <10 hectares; business: <10 employees)	5.0%	65.3%	100%	33.2%	33	0%	75.2%	99.0%	23.1%	68
No. Members	No. of registered members	100	5,190	15,000	4377	34	50	930	9,000	1584	74
<i>Other Variables</i>											
Member Fee %	% of members that pay membership fees	1.0%	31.8%	80.0%	26.0%	18	4.3%	57.8%	100%	29.2%	71
No. Employees	No. of full-time employees that receive a salary	0	6.3	25	6.5	32	1	11.2	230	30.8	56
Org. Contact	No. of times contacted org's in the same sector in past year	0	24.9	100	25.6	32	0	21.6	100	27.3	70
Meetings	No. of full-membership meetings held in the last 3 years	1	14.2	120	25.3	33	0	8.8	72	11.9	64
Attendance	% of members attended most recent meeting	2.7%	54.5%	100%	29.3%	34	1.0%	36.1%	100%	27.5%	56


Note: *N*'s report number of respondents from each sector with valid responses. Multivariate analyses in main text use imputed sectoral medians for units with missing values on organizational traits.

Correlation Matrix of Organizational Traits

	Resource Flows	Member Services	% Micro Members	No. of Members
Resource Flows	1.00			
Member Services	0.12	1.00		
% Micro Members	-0.04	0.01	1.00	
No. of Members	0.07	0.38***	-0.02	1.00

Note: Pearson correlation coefficients presented. Two-tailed significance level: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Appendix C: Histograms, Participation and Demands Indices



Appendix D: Sensitivity Analysis

Sensitivity Analysis Using Only Complete Survey Responses

	Institutional Participation	Electoral Participation	Extra-Inst. Participation	Programmatic Demands	Distributive Demands
Resource Flows	0.27** (0.13)	0.09 (0.17)	0.38** (0.16)	0.35* (0.20)	0.02 (0.17)
Member Services	0.59** (0.29)	0.04 (0.47)	0.61* (0.36)	0.90** (0.45)	-0.00 (0.40)
% Micro Members	0.07 (0.57)	0.98 (0.81)	0.77 (0.75)	0.68 (0.94)	0.36 (0.85)
Business Sector	1.63 (1.34)	-1.37 (2.21)	3.36** (1.66)	1.96 (2.08)	-1.17 (1.84)
log(No. of Members)	0.31*** (0.11)	0.26 (0.16)	0.59*** (0.14)	0.34* (0.18)	0.57*** (0.16)
Ruling Party (PRI)	0.24 (0.33)	0.05 (0.44)	0.24 (0.41)	0.43 (0.52)	0.43 (0.46)
Ruling Party (PRD)	0.12 (0.43)	-0.20 (0.60)	-0.80 (0.59)	0.97 (0.70)	-0.18 (0.62)
Vote Margin	0.53 (1.38)	-1.13 (1.98)	-3.21* (1.74)	1.88 (2.17)	-2.88 (1.95)
Services:Business	-0.49 (0.31)	0.16 (0.51)	-0.73* (0.40)	-0.36 (0.49)	0.28 (0.44)
(Intercept)	-1.78 (1.42)	0.25 (2.39)	-5.32*** (1.77)	-4.22* (2.17)	0.42 (1.93)
R ²	0.43	0.23	0.40	0.34	0.33
Adj. R ²	0.35	0.12	0.31	0.24	0.23
Num. obs.	71	70	70	74	72

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Sensitivity Analysis for Collinearity: Institutional Participation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Resource Flows	0.38*** (0.13)	0.30** (0.13)				
Member Services			0.47*** (0.12)	0.35** (0.14)		
% Micro Members					-0.64 (0.58)	-0.55 (0.58)
Business Sector		-0.31 (0.36)		0.25 (0.36)		0.04 (0.36)
log(No. of Members)		0.29** (0.12)		0.33*** (0.11)		0.39*** (0.11)
Ruling Party (PRI)		-0.11 (0.29)		-0.24 (0.29)		-0.22 (0.30)
Ruling Party (PRD)		-0.21 (0.45)		-0.13 (0.45)		-0.30 (0.45)
Vote Margin		1.22 (1.17)		1.39 (1.16)		1.41 (1.24)
(Intercept)	2.44*** (0.39)	0.84 (0.91)	1.82*** (0.44)	-0.10 (0.99)	3.95*** (0.45)	1.26 (1.00)
R ²	0.09	0.26	0.15	0.27	0.01	0.22
Adj. R ²	0.08	0.21	0.14	0.22	0.00	0.17
Num. obs.	89	89	89	89	89	89

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Sensitivity Analysis for Collinearity: Programmatic Demands

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Resource Flows	0.50** (0.19)	0.35* (0.20)				
Member Services			0.73*** (0.18)	0.77*** (0.20)		
% Micro Members					0.39 (0.89)	-0.01 (0.91)
Business Sector		0.35 (0.55)		1.25** (0.51)		0.67 (0.54)
log(No. of Members)		0.46** (0.18)		0.41** (0.16)		0.56*** (0.17)
Ruling Party (PRI)		-0.32 (0.45)		-0.48 (0.42)		-0.38 (0.46)
Ruling Party (PRD)		0.23 (0.70)		0.57 (0.67)		0.14 (0.71)
Vote Margin		3.07* (1.81)		3.71** (1.70)		3.22* (1.89)
(Intercept)	2.48*** (0.55)	-0.65 (1.40)	1.27* (0.67)	-2.67* (1.43)	3.54*** (0.70)	-0.56 (1.54)
R ²	0.07	0.20	0.15	0.29	0.00	0.17
Adj. R ²	0.06	0.14	0.14	0.24	-0.01	0.11
Num. obs.	93	93	93	93	93	93

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Sensitivity Analysis for Social Desirability: Programmatic Demands

	Binary Measures			Extreme Responses Excluded		
Resource Flows	0.28*** (0.10)		0.21** (0.10)	0.49** (0.20)		0.30 (0.21)
Member Services		0.46*** (0.12)	0.34*** (0.13)		0.52** (0.21)	0.58** (0.23)
% Micro Members			0.06 (0.20)			0.65 (1.02)
Business Sector			0.11 (0.13)			1.06* (0.61)
log(No. of Members)			0.08** (0.04)			0.30 (0.18)
Ruling Party (PRI)			0.03 (0.10)			-0.49 (0.46)
Ruling Party (PRD)			0.21 (0.16)			0.72 (0.72)
Vote Margin			0.37 (0.41)			4.34** (1.89)
(Intercept)	0.50*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.11)	-0.50 (0.33)	2.27*** (0.58)	1.83** (0.75)	-2.67 (1.61)
R ²	0.09	0.14	0.27	0.07	0.07	0.27
Adj. R ²	0.08	0.13	0.20	0.06	0.06	0.19
Num. obs.	93	93	93	83	83	83

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. The first three columns replace Resource Flows, Member Services, and the Programmatic Demands Index with binary measures where values of three or higher are coded as 1 and values of two or lower are coded as 0. The next three columns exclude from the main dataset cases with the maximum scores on the Programmatic Demands Index and Resource Flows or Member Services. Ten such cases were excluded.

Sensitivity Analysis for Index Components

	Institutional Part. Index		Programmatic Demands Index		
	No. Ministries Contacted	No. Politicians Contacted	Contacted Ministry (Programmatic)	Contacted Politician (Programmatic)	Extra-Inst Part. (Programmatic)
Resource Flows	0.09 (0.10)	0.30* (0.16)	0.62* (0.32)	0.37 (0.28)	0.27 (0.23)
Member Services	0.72*** (0.19)	0.81*** (0.30)	1.63** (0.67)	1.37** (0.62)	0.49 (0.44)
% Micro Members	-0.50 (0.46)	-0.42 (0.66)	-0.30 (1.43)	0.56 (1.23)	0.06 (1.05)
Business Sector	1.28 (0.92)	3.94*** (1.43)	2.94 (3.01)	5.40* (2.85)	0.52 (2.06)
log(No. of Members)	0.25*** (0.09)	0.18 (0.13)	0.34 (0.25)	0.47* (0.24)	0.07 (0.20)
Ruling Party (PRI)	-0.02 (0.23)	-0.58* (0.33)	-1.51** (0.68)	-0.19 (0.61)	-0.15 (0.50)
Ruling Party (PRD)	-0.20 (0.35)	-0.04 (0.51)	0.87 (0.96)	0.81 (0.91)	-0.01 (0.77)
Vote Margin	1.14 (0.95)	1.83 (1.33)	6.17** (2.96)	5.95* (3.15)	2.22 (2.14)
Services:Business	-0.54** (0.23)	-0.75** (0.34)	-0.48 (0.73)	-0.98 (0.69)	-0.27 (0.51)
(Intercept)	-1.59 (1.04)	-2.00 (1.59)	-9.44** (3.98)	-10.30*** (3.67)	-2.59 (2.36)
Type of Model	OLS	OLS	logit	logit	logit
R ²	0.56	0.24			
Adj. R ²	0.51	0.15			
AIC			102.39	105.35	137.49
Num. obs.	92	90	92	93	93

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Appendix E: Multivariate Analysis for Intermediating Variables

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Institutional Participation		0.69*** (0.16)			0.49** (0.19)
Electoral Participation			0.18 (0.13)		0.01 (0.13)
Extra-Inst. Participation				0.50*** (0.13)	0.40*** (0.14)
Resource Flows	0.27 (0.20)	0.14 (0.20)	0.35* (0.20)	0.15 (0.19)	0.15 (0.20)
Member Services	1.11*** (0.37)	0.30 (0.39)	1.30** (0.51)	0.60 (0.39)	0.20 (0.65)
% Micro Members	-0.05 (0.88)	0.53 (0.80)	0.03 (0.93)	-0.15 (0.85)	0.11 (0.88)
Business Sector	2.98* (1.76)	-0.39 (1.81)	3.80 (2.40)	0.38 (1.84)	-1.24 (3.11)
log(No. of Members)	0.34** (0.17)	0.08 (0.17)	0.18 (0.19)	0.10 (0.18)	-0.15 (0.20)
Ruling Party (PRI)	-0.44 (0.44)	-0.28 (0.41)	-0.52 (0.45)	-0.24 (0.42)	-0.18 (0.42)
Ruling Party (PRD)	0.58 (0.67)	0.47 (0.61)	0.34 (0.70)	1.28* (0.70)	0.95 (0.72)
Vote Margin	3.53** (1.77)	2.69 (1.68)	3.84** (1.87)	4.09** (1.72)	3.68** (1.78)
Services:Business	-0.52 (0.43)	0.20 (0.43)	-0.74 (0.56)	0.02 (0.44)	0.35 (0.70)
(Intercept)	-4.15** (1.98)	-1.24 (1.98)	-4.54* (2.66)	-1.41 (2.09)	0.46 (3.51)
R ²	0.31	0.43	0.33	0.42	0.47
Adj. R ²	0.24	0.36	0.24	0.34	0.37
Num. obs.	93	89	87	87	80

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$