

## Appendix A: Comparing Classes of Beneficiaries on Covariates

The table below expands on Table 7, comparing respondents in different classes of beneficiaries on several covariates measured in the survey, broken into “socio-demographic” and “political” traits. There is notable variation overall in these traits. As expected, given the criteria for accessing Prospera, beneficiaries of this program tend to be poorer, more rural, more indigenous, younger, female, and with lower levels of education than non-beneficiaries or beneficiaries of the other (mostly non-means tested) programs. Non-Prospera beneficiaries tend to be more similar to non-beneficiaries on socio-economic traits, with the exceptions that the former include a higher percentage are men and a higher mean age.

Beneficiaries of both types of programs tend to be more politically active than non-beneficiaries, with the most pronounced differences for Prospera beneficiaries, who were 9.4 percentage points more likely to vote than non-beneficiaries and over twice as likely to identify with the PRI. In contrast, non-Prospera beneficiaries were significantly more likely to know somebody exposed to clientelism, perhaps because the allocation of these discretionary programs operates through clientelist networks. While interesting on their own, these notable differences between subgroups motivate additional robustness checks of main findings using multivariate analysis to verify that different rates of responding to the sensitive survey items for different classes of beneficiaries are not confounded by these other contrasting traits. This additional analysis can be found in Appendix B.

Variable	Non-Beneficiaries	Prospera Ben.	Non-Prospera Ben.
<i>Socio-Demographic Traits</i>			
Female	.494	.572***	.436*
Age	40.4	37.9**	45.3***
Rural	.206	.519***	.205
Indigenous	.136	.307***	.111
Income (ordinal)	9.51	6.37***	9.95
Education (ordinal)	5.80	4.56***	5.79
Informal Sector	.400	.434	.391
<i>Political Traits</i>			
Political Participation Index	.418	.584*	.529
Protest	.249	.346*	.326
Volunteer	.169	.250*	.202
Voted in 2015	.621	.715***	.696**
Partisan	.498	.642***	.564*
PRI Partisan	.117	.240***	.103
Clientelism	.350	.381	.445***
Sources of Political Info.	2.60	2.34**	2.74
<i>N</i>	883	258	273

*Note:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . All tests of significance compare subgroup to Non-Beneficiaries.

## Appendix B: Multivariate Analysis

This appendix displays multivariate regression models predicting responses to the sensitive answer options from the list experiment, using Blair and Imai’s (2012) *list* package in R. This item count regression technique predicts each covariate’s effect on the likelihood of responding affirmatively to the sensitive item of the experiment as if this quantity were measured independently for each respondent. It thus allows us to observe the predictive power of our independent variable (beneficiary status) while controlling for potential confounders. It is important to note that this technique absorbs a great deal of statistical power, resulting in a much higher bar for statistical significance. Nonetheless, the regression findings largely corroborate our main findings. Across multiple specifications predicting responses to the organizational treatment condition, the coefficient for Prospera beneficiaries (compared with non-beneficiaries) is negative, ranging from 12 to 20 percentage points while the coefficient for non-Prospera beneficiary status is positive, with magnitude between 13 and 27 percentage points. While some of these coefficients fall below the level of statistical significance, the difference between Prospera and non-Prospera beneficiaries is statistically significant at the 95 percent level in all specifications, with magnitude between 33 and 44 percentage points. The only other covariate that produces significant results in the regressions for the organizational treatment is Age. In the analysis of the campaign treatment, none of the covariates (including beneficiary status) have statistically significant relationships.

	Campaign Treatment			Org. Treatment		
Prospera Beneficiary	-0.091 (0.114)	0.09 (0.146)	0.129 (0.148)	<i>-0.198**</i> (0.094)	-0.173 (0.131)	-0.116 (0.131)
Non-Prospera Ben.	-0.088 (0.122)	0.028 (0.143)	0.021 (0.149)	0.131 (0.136)	<i>0.271*</i> (0.164)	0.239 (0.168)
Income		0.008 (0.013)	0.009 (0.013)		-0.003 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.013)
Rural		-0.083 (0.141)	-0.124 (0.142)		-0.039 (0.144)	-0.06 (0.144)
Age		-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)		<i>-0.01**</i> (0.004)	<i>-0.009**</i> (0.004)
Indigenous		0.097 (0.132)	0.075 (0.139)		0.058 (0.146)	0.016 (0.147)
State (CDMX)		0.195 (0.149)	0.154 (0.155)		0.21 (0.159)	0.186 (0.163)
Participation Index			0.007 (0.065)			-0.065 (0.054)
Partisan			0.038 (0.126)			0.089 (0.126)
PRI identity			-0.108 (0.167)			-0.227 (0.166)
Org. Member			0.054 (0.119)			0.001 (0.12)
Residual Standard Error	0.712	0.715	0.717	0.717	0.738	0.735
Num. obs.	947	736	719	951	732	713

*Note:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Analysis conducted using *list* package in R. See Blair and Imai (2012). Reference category for *Prospera Beneficiary* and *Non-Prospera Ben.* is *Non-Beneficiaries*.

## Appendix C: Analysis Disaggregated by State

This appendix reproduces all results from the main paper, disaggregating between the two states where our experiment was conducted, Chiapas and Mexico City. Results are largely consistent with the main analysis, although they introduce some interesting qualifications. Given that the vast majority of Prospera beneficiaries are from Chiapas (238 out of 258), the observed relationship between Prospera beneficiary status and perception of organizational conditioning is driven largely by results from that state. Non-Prospera beneficiaries are tilted more to Mexico City, but not nearly at the same magnitude (174 out of 273). And the positive relationship between being a beneficiary of these more discretionary programs and reporting organizational conditioning is limited to Mexico City. More broadly, overall treatment effects are much larger in the Mexico City sample than in the Chiapas sample.

Table 4, Disaggregated by State

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Chiapas		
All Beneficiaries	-0.104 (0.127)	-0.315** (0.136)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.021 (0.128)	-0.299** (0.118)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.176 (0.188)	-0.088 (0.204)
Mexico City		
All Beneficiaries	-0.072 (0.163)	0.241 (0.175)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.199 (0.499)	-0.192 (0.462)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.042 (0.168)	0.285 (0.183)

*Note:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are the multivariate regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, generated using “ictreg” function from *list* package in R.

Table 5, Disaggregated by State

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Chiapas		
Low Income	0.076 (0.077)	0.172** (0.077)
High Income	0.109 (0.133)	0.169 (0.134)
Difference btwn. Low and High	-0.033 (0.154)	0.003 (0.154)
Mexico City		
Low Income	0.391** (0.151)	0.468*** (0.144)
High Income	0.281*** (0.095)	0.432*** (0.106)
Difference btwn. Low and High	0.11 (0.178)	0.036 (0.179)

*Note:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are estimated proportions of positive responses to sensitive item on subsets corresponding to low-income and high-income respondents. Difference calculated using t-test.

Table 6, Disaggregated by State

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Chiapas, Low-Income		
All Beneficiaries	0.111 (0.154)	-0.173 (0.197)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.012 (0.152)	-0.306** (0.156)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	0.199 (0.165)	0.249 (0.195)
Chiapas, High-Income		
All Beneficiaries	-0.319 (0.335)	-0.583* (0.303)
Prospera Beneficiaries	0.103 (0.329)	-0.301 (0.273)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	-1.007* (0.568)	-0.779 (0.646)
Mexico City, Low-Income		
All Beneficiaries	0.076 (0.341)	0.476 (0.436)
Prospera Beneficiaries	0.8 (NA)	-0.5 (NA)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.124 (0.344)	0.676 (0.483)
Mexico City, High-Income		
All Beneficiaries	-0.004 (0.226)	0.414 (0.254)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.786** (0.389)	0.586 (0.809)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	0.097 (0.231)	0.398 (0.261)

*Note:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are the multivariate regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, generated using “ictreg” function from *list* package in R. Only 16 respondents reported income and were Prospera beneficiaries. 10 of these were classified as high-income and only 6 as low-income, making it impossible to calculate standard errors.

## Appendix D: Analysis Disaggregated by Membership Status

This appendix reproduces analysis distinguishing between respondents who are organization members (including those that have a member in their immediate social circle) versus those that are not. When interpreting results for the organizational treatment, this distinction determines whether the respondent is speaking from their personal experience or simply from their perception. Results mostly hold up across both members and non-members. Interestingly, the largest treatment effects appear for low-income non-members (Table 6). Prospera beneficiaries in this category are over 40 percent less likely to report organizational conditioning than other respondents, while non-Prospera beneficiaries are 62 percent *more* likely to report organizational conditioning.

Table 4, Disaggregated by Membership Status

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Members		
All Beneficiaries	-0.238 (0.155)	-0.101 (0.156)
Prospera Beneficiaries	0.003 (0.154)	-0.218 (0.135)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	<i>-0.373** (0.189)</i>	0.033 (0.219)
Non-Members		
All Beneficiaries	0.012 (0.14)	-0.033 (0.142)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.139 (0.191)	<i>-0.306* (0.162)</i>
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	0.132 (0.164)	0.187 (0.17)

*Note:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are the multivariate regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, generated using “ictreg” function from *list* package in R.

Table 5, Disaggregated by Membership Status

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Members		
Low Income	<i>0.316*** (0.101)</i>	<i>0.319*** (0.095)</i>
High Income	0.134 (0.116)	<i>0.32** (0.126)</i>
Difference btwn. Low and High	0.182 (0.154)	-0.001 (0.158)
Non-Members		
Low Income	0.138 (0.095)	<i>0.264** (0.107)</i>
High Income	<i>0.303*** (0.109)</i>	<i>0.383*** (0.116)</i>
Difference btwn. Low and High	-0.238 (0.15)	-0.118 (0.157)

*Note:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are estimated proportions of positive responses to sensitive item on subsets corresponding to low-income and high-income respondents. Difference calculated using t-test.

Table 6, Disaggregated by Membership Status

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Members, Low-Income		
All Beneficiaries	-0.111 (0.266)	-0.221 (0.242)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.101 (0.215)	-0.279 (0.198)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	0.022 (0.234)	0.105 (0.267)
Members, High-Income		
All Beneficiaries	-0.272 (0.273)	0.113 (0.298)
Prospera Beneficiaries	0.429 (0.451)	-0.138 (0.277)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	<i>-0.595* (0.309)</i>	0.106 (0.369)
Non-Members, Low-Income		
All Beneficiaries	0.171 (0.199)	0.093 (0.219)
Prospera Beneficiaries	0.39 (0.284)	<i>-0.407** (0.18)</i>
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.059 (0.192)	<i>0.62** (0.309)</i>
Non-Members, High-Income		
All Beneficiaries	0.129 (0.274)	0 (0.271)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.541 (0.476)	-0.464 (0.491)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	0.336 (0.298)	0.227 (0.303)

*Note:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are the multivariate regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, generated using “ictreg” function from *list* package in R.

## Appendix E: Reproducing Analysis for Alternative Measures of Class

This appendix reproduces Tables 5 and 6 from the main analysis using alternative measures for social class rather than the household income measure. These include a measure of the respondent’s household’s income relative to the state-specific median for Chiapas (2,200 pesos) or Mexico City (4,450 pesos), as opposed to median for the pooled sample; respondent’s level of education, based on a median value of having completed secondary education and no more schooling; and whether the electoral section for the respondent (the lowest level of aggregation available) is above or below the median in household occupancy rate (1.1 inhabitants per room), a measure of poverty. We additionally reproduce analysis dividing between respondents residing in urban or rural municipalities, based on living in municipalities with populations over or under 50,000.

Results are quite consistent with findings using the income measure reported in the main analysis. Both list experiments yield positive treatment effects across all categories measured in different specifications of Table 5 (high- versus low-income, high-versus low education, high- versus low-poverty municipalities), with the exception of rural residents who report much lower levels on both treatment conditions (although rural residents only represent 26 percent of respondents). Replications of Table 6 offer more nuanced findings of the effect of beneficiary status on responding positively to the treatment conditions. Negative coefficients for Prospera beneficiaries actually have quite larger magnitudes for respondents with high incomes (using the state-based measure), with higher levels of education, and for those living in urban areas. However, each of these categories represent a small minority of Prospera beneficiaries, who tend to be poor, uneducated, and rural.

Table 5 Using State-Based Measure of Income

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Low Income	0.216*** (0.074)	0.334*** (0.073)
High Income	0.176** (0.075)	0.276*** (0.082)
Difference btwn. Low and High	0.04 (0.106)	0.057 (0.11)

*Note:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are estimated proportions of positive responses to sensitive item on subsets corresponding to low-income and high-income respondents. Difference calculated using t-test.



Table 6 Using State-Based Measure of Income

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Low-Income		
All Beneficiaries	0.137 (0.148)	0.042 (0.156)
Prospera Beneficiaries	0.129 (0.166)	-0.277* (0.143)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	0.042 (0.152)	0.357* (0.196)
High-Income		
All-Beneficiaries	-0.264 (0.172)	-0.118 (0.189)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.349** (0.175)	-0.413** (0.172)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.138 (0.22)	0.115 (0.247)

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are the multivariate regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, generated using “ictreg” function from *list* package in R.

Table 5 Using Education as Class Measure

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Low Education	0.182*** (0.062)	0.134** (0.062)
High Education	0.278*** (0.071)	0.39*** (0.072)
Difference btwn. Low and High	-0.096 (0.095)	-0.256*** (0.095)

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are estimated proportions of positive responses to sensitive item on subsets corresponding to low-education and high-education respondents. Difference calculated using t-test.

Table 6 Using Education as Class Measure

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Low-Education		
All Beneficiaries	-0.083 (0.13)	-0.106 (0.137)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.049 (0.137)	-0.168 (0.123)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.059 (0.139)	0.059 (0.187)
High-Education		
All Beneficiaries	-0.069 (0.166)	-0.002 (0.16)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.03 (0.208)	-0.367** (0.156)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.097 (0.207)	0.138 (0.19)

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are the multivariate regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, generated using “ictreg” function from *list* package in R.

Table 5 Using Poverty as Class Measure (Based on Municipal Occupancy Rate)

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Low Poverty	0.106* (0.06)	0.113* (0.061)
High Poverty	0.333*** (0.071)	0.399*** (0.072)
Difference btwn. Low and High	-0.227** (0.093)	-0.286*** (0.094)

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are estimated proportions of positive responses to sensitive item on subsets corresponding to respondents living in low-poverty and high-poverty municipalities. Difference calculated using t-test.

Table 6 Using Poverty as Class Measure (Based on Municipal Occupancy Rate)

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Low-Poverty		
All Beneficiaries	-0.246* (0.128)	-0.394*** (0.138)
Prospera Beneficiaries	0.005 (0.131)	-0.237* (0.12)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.421** (0.176)	-0.31 (0.196)
High-Poverty		
All Beneficiaries	0.103 (0.158)	0.384** (0.167)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.064 (0.274)	-0.073 (0.249)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	0.149 (0.171)	0.441** (0.184)

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are the multivariate regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, generated using “ictreg” function from *list* package in R.

Table 5 Comparing Urban and Rural

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Rural Residents	0.104 (0.08)	0.087 (0.079)
Urban Residents	0.26*** (0.057)	0.312*** (0.058)
Difference btwn. Rural and Urban	-0.156 (0.098)	-0.123 (0.097)

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are estimated proportions of positive responses to sensitive item on subsets corresponding to low-income and high-income respondents. Difference calculated using t-test.

Table 6 Comparing Urban and Rural

	Campaign Treatment	Org. Treatment
Rural Residents		
All Beneficiaries	-0.197 (0.18)	-0.291 (0.189)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.066 (0.183)	-0.166 (0.166)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.283 (0.253)	-0.187 (0.256)
Urban Residents		
All Beneficiaries	-0.073 (0.12)	0.044 (0.13)
Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.075 (0.15)	-0.313** (0.123)
Non-Prospera Beneficiaries	-0.034 (0.139)	0.221 (0.156)

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Cell entries are the multivariate regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, generated using “ictreg” function from *list* package in R.